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ABSTRACT 
 
The Conditional Effects of Female Descriptive Representation: A Study of Policy 
Influence in State Legislatures, 1983-2002. December 2011 
Mary Elizabeth Barnes, B.A., The University of Texas at Austin; M.A., Sam Houston 
State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Kenneth J. Meier 
 
Many scholars believe in order to have democratic legitimacy, females should be 
represented in governing bodies at all levels.  Significant literature on female descriptive 
representation in the U.S. for women’s policy responsiveness confirms the importance 
between the percentage of females in the legislature and public policy that represents 
women’s interests.  At the same time, there is research suggesting female representatives 
do not always represent women’s interests.  This study examined female descriptive 
representation and incorporation and its effect on substantive representation of female 
group salient issues and answered the following research question:  Does an increase in 
female descriptive representation, institutional mechanisms of influence, or other 
political conditional factors lead to better substantive representation of female group 
salient issues?   
This research project replicated Robert Preuhs’ 2006 work by studying the 
conditional effects of female descriptive representation in the state legislature from 
1983-2002.  The study is important because it turns to state level data and accounts for 
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all mechanisms of influence, as well as conditional effects of a liberal governing 
coalition, to determine whether female descriptive representation exerts policy influence.  
Five theoretical models were presented and tested in this work:  The Presence Model, the 
Simple Incorporation Model, the Specific Institutional Incorporation Model, The Broad 
Institutional Incorporation Model, and The Party as a Substantive Representative Model. 
The dependent variables selected were per pupil educational expenditures, percentage of 
children without health insurance, welfare benefits, and percentage of child support 
collected.  An OLS model with a lagged dependent variable and panel correlated 
standard errors was used to estimate the coefficients for each dependent variable.  
Female descriptive representation and incorporation did have some influence on 
substantive representation with welfare benefits and percentage of child support 
collected.  The female influence is important and increasing the number of females in the 
legislature will result in more policy and benefits for issues important to women in 
society.   However, examining the issues in a different way or with different dependent 
variables may provide better results indicating the importance of female descriptive 
representation on substantive representation of female group salient issues.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 John Stuart Mill, British philosopher and economist, argued more than a century 
ago “in the absence of its natural defenders, the interest of the omitted is always in 
danger of being overlooked; and when looked at, is seen with very different eyes from 
those of the persons who it directly concerns” (as cited in Pitkin 1967, 22).  Hannah 
Pitkin felt similar and considered it only logical “to expect the composition [of a 
legislature] to determine its activities” (1967, 63).  Significant literature on female 
descriptive representation in the U.S. for women’s policy responsiveness confirms the 
importance between the percentage of females in the legislature and public policy that 
represents women’s interests (Reingold 2000; Swers 2002; Thomas 1991, for example).  
At the same time, there is research suggesting female representatives do not always 
represent women’s interests (Phillips 1995; Weldon 2002).  This study will examine 
female descriptive representation and incorporation and its effect on substantive 
representation of female group salient issues and answer the following research question:  
Does an increase in female descriptive representation, institutional mechanisms of 
influence, or other political conditional factors lead to better substantive representation 
of female group salient issues?   
Many scholars believe in order to have democratic legitimacy, females should be  
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of American Journal of Political Science. 
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represented in governing bodies at all levels.  “A government that is democratically 
organized cannot be truly legitimate if all its citizens from…both sexes do not have a 
potential interest in and opportunity for serving their community and nation” (Thomas 
1998, 1).  There is also growing evidence that female representatives have been found to 
identify with promoting a more gender-equal society and that women's presence in 
political decision-making is “essential” for a quality democratic process (Galligan 2007).  
The opportunity in the United States for females to run and get elected to governing 
bodies is now available to them.  At the same time, examining the number of females in 
governing bodies, women are still grossly underrepresented.  Does this 
underrepresentation affect the policy issues and preferences being addressed?  Does an 
increase in female officeholders result in increased attention to different types of issues 
and interest in governing bodies? Is it merely the number of females in government 
offices that have the influence on policy or is it positions of power that garner influence?  
Are there conditional factors at work that negate female legislators’ influence?   
Much work in the gender politics literature stresses the importance of electing 
more women to public office in order to adequately represent females and the political 
issues that they find most important.  In other words, increasing female descriptive 
representation will lead to great substantive representation.  Women will “stand for” 
women and also “act for” them (Pitkin 1967).  Many female legislators have expressed 
that they are equipped to handle female constituent issues and they are committed to 
representing women (Carroll 2003; Chaney, Alvarez and Nagler 1998; Reingold 1992; 
Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005).  In studies of state legislatures, women reported 
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more liberal policy attitudes and they exhibited a greater commitment to pursuing 
legislation important to women (Dolan and Ford 1995; Thomas 1994).  Majorities of 
both Democratic and Republican female legislators have revealed they have a 
responsibility to represent women’s interests (“Women State Legislators” 2001).  In 
local governing bodies, because of their smaller size and less formal rules, the influence 
of minority legislators was stronger (Meier and Stewart 1991; Meier, et al. 2005; 
Stewart, England and Meier 1989) and women are more likely to speak out in favor of 
issues (Flammang 1985).  Evidence from studies of Congress reveal that more women 
are sponsoring legislation important to females, participating in floor debates on 
women’s issues, and using their positions on committees to make sure legislation related 
to women’s issues does not fail (Dodson 1998; Swers 2000). 
There is significant literature revealing a “yes” when answering the questions of 
whether women better represent women (Mansbridge 1999), but there is also a 
significant amount or literature negating this claim.  Women may behave in an isolated 
manner when legislating and they may not be able to articulate what females as a group 
really want (Weldon 2002).  There may be no way to establish accountability to women 
as a group (Phillips 1995).  As Pitkin suggests, in order to fully understand 
representation, one must study all forms of representation, not just focusing on 
descriptive and substantive.  Formal representation, referring to the institutional rules 
and processes, and symbolic representation, referring to how the represented “feel” 
about their representative is also important to understanding female representation 
(Pitkin 1967).  Also, while women have made significant gains in representation, women 
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are still underrepresented as a group.  Some scholars argue that until women reach the 
“critical mass” level, or become a large minority in the legislature, they will not have as 
much impact particularly when women are only a few token representatives (Childs and 
Krook 2008; Kanter 1977).  Other scholars find different conditions could lead to female 
legislators having policy successes besides reaching a certain percentage in the 
legislature (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007).  Finally, there is research indicating 
that descriptive representation is not always the best way to gain substantive 
representation.  Constituent’s substantive interests must be represented and if a non-
descriptive representative (someone who doesn’t share the same physical characteristics 
of the constituent) can best do that, there should not be a push for descriptive 
representation (Diamond 1977; Mansbridge 1999; Swain 1993; Young 1997). 
 From the research that indicates female descriptive representation is the best way 
to have substantive representation of female group salient issues, there must be a clear 
distinction between female salient issues and male salient issues.  Do females have a 
“different voice” (Gilligan 1982b)?  Historically and through the time period of this 
study (1983-2002), women are a seen as a diverse group of people but still a group that 
has political opinions distinguishable from men and share interests that are salient to 
women as a group (Sapiro 1981; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2007).  Findings suggest 
women are typically more supportive of government programs, government spending 
and government action (Gilligan 1982b; Schlesinger and Heldman 2000; Shapiro and 
Mahajan 1986).  Women are more compassionate than men, favor and support social 
policies, like issues dealing with families and children, education, health care, while men 
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have more “pocketbook” concerns and prioritize issues dealing with the tax cuts, the 
economy, and business (Alvarez and McCaffery 2003; Thomas 1991).  Due to women’s 
role as caregiver and their historically disadvantaged role in society, they tend to 
advocate more for these needs in society and push government to do the same (Carroll 
1988; Gidengil 1995).  There is a gender gap between men and women on issues of 
social policy and social welfare spending and the salience of these issues are found to be 
one of the strongest predictors of behavior for females and males (Kaufmann and 
Petrocik 1999).    
If a gender gap exists between males and females in society, how does this 
translate into legislative behavior, especially if descriptive representation is a good 
predictor of substantive representation?  Personal interviews of legislators have revealed 
that female legislators give higher priority to women’s issues.  Historically, they have 
focused their attention in the legislature on issues such as health care, the welfare of 
families and children, and women’s rights legislation (Carroll 2003; Dodson and Carroll 
1991; Thomas 1994; Tamerius 1995; Flammang 1997).  Interviews of female legislators 
reveal that their top priority was to expand women’s opportunities, protect the rights of 
women, and support and work on legislation to benefit women more than male 
legislators.  Many female members of Congress believe they are “surrogate 
representatives” for women (Carroll 2003, 11).   
Female legislators are also found to prioritize women’s issues differently than 
men because women have found new institutional strategies to engage in feminist 
activities.  Female legislators typically identify with feminism and are closely related to 
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networks providing the female group perspective (Carroll 2003; Katzenstein 1998).  
Women feel accountable to the women’s movements and think in terms of the group 
perspective which is important to substantive representation of female group salient 
issues (Mansbridge 1999).  What about women who do not identify as feminist?  Some 
scholars argue that they may be “closet” feminists (Carroll 2003) and are committed to 
the goals of the women’s movement even though they do not make that position public.  
Even Republican women legislators have revealed, though they differ ideologically than 
Democrats, that they will seek to promote legislation they believe will serve women and 
they work across party lines to address women’s issues (Hawkesworth, et al, 2001).  At 
the same time, in a highly polarized political environment, Republican female 
lawmakers are pressured by their party and they may change their sponsorship on social 
welfare or feminist legislation in order to advance within the party (Hawkesworth, et al, 
2001; Swers 2000).  In the single member representative districts, female legislators may 
also feel pressure to represent their constituents (promissory representation) and the 
female group perspective may conflict with the constituents’ demands. 
 There is significant research suggesting men and women differ in leadership 
styles.  In general, females are found to be more approachable, trustworthy, and better 
communicators (Beck 1991; Men and Women: Who’s the Better Leader 2008).  They are 
also more interested in hearing and addressing constituent concerns (Fox and Shuhmann 
1999; Thomas 1991, 1994).  When women move into leadership roles, they may face a 
different, and more hostile, environment than men and they may not receive the same 
respect as men (Yoder 1991; Kathlene 1994).    “Gender, as described and applied in this 
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literature, is a complex and interacting construct representing struggles over the use and 
definition of power, methods of managing conflict and building consensus, paths toward 
implementing change, and resistance by supporters of the status quo” (Kathlene 1994, 
561).  Females tend to lead more democratically, serve as a facilitator or moderator, and 
work toward consensus while men lead autocratically and are more controlling of 
discussion and debate (Kathlene 1991, 1994; Rosenthal 2002).   
In summary, women are underrepresented in governing bodies and an increase in 
female lawmakers has resulted in more attention to female group salient issues.  Women 
and men have differences of opinion on a wide range of political issues as well as how 
they prioritize these issues.  Women may differ with each other on their opinions on 
political issues but, there are trends in the issues that women prioritize as most 
important.  Men and women also vary in voting behavior, there are differences in their 
overall political party affiliation, and they differ in their behavior as elected officials.  
They are also found to have different styles of leadership.  Therefore, what impact does 
the increase in the number of female lawmakers and their institutional incorporation in 
state legislatures across the United States have on public policy?  
Robert Preuhs (2006) examined the issue of descriptive representation a different 
way in his work on minorities.  He found that a number of different theories were 
supported when testing whether minorities had an effect on policy decisions of state 
legislatures.  Prior to Preuhs work, studies found the strongest influence was with 
descriptive representation in local lawmaking bodies like school boards.  He examined 
the number of minorities in the state legislature and also their incorporation into the 
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institution.  For example, holding formal leadership positions like committee chair 
positions, majority or minority party leaders, or Speaker of the House and/or President of 
the Senate, led to minority lawmaker’s influence on AFDC benefits.  Further, he 
examined minority descriptive representation and how it is conditional on liberal 
governing coalitions.  Liberal party platforms reflect preferences of minorities so 
descriptive representation did not make much difference (Browning, Marshall, Tabb 
1984; Swain 1995).  Previous work had not examined all the competing theories nor had 
they examined the conditioning effects of a liberal governing coalition and racialized 
political context. 
Examining the impact of females in the state legislature dates back to the early 
1970s when the number of women elected to the legislatures began to increase.
1
  The 
addition of females allows research to focus on their impact on specific female group 
salient issues.   The gender and representation literature has failed to examine all the 
competing theories of female descriptive representation and incorporation presented by 
Preuhs to determine where female representatives have the greatest influence on policy 
decisions.   
Preuhs’ work concluded with interesting results regarding minority descriptive 
representation on AFDC benefits in a state.  Minorities did have influence outside of 
local governing bodies but their influence was conditioned by the racialized political 
context as well as party control in state legislatures (Preuhs 2006, 585).  Given these 
findings, this study will replicate Preuhs’ work using female representation and 
                                                 
1
 During this same period, women began to increase their presence in elected office in general. 
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incorporation as independent variables based on the models in his work.  Women differ 
from one another in terms of race, socioeconomic background, education, etc. and they 
do not always agree on what constitutes women’s interests (Hawkesworth 2001).  This 
makes identifying female group salient issues challenging.  But, evidence from public 
opinion polling and interviews of male and female legislators reveal trends in the gender 
gap in policy issues and differences in how males and females prioritize these issues. 
Based on the literature, the dependent variables selected to examine include issues 
traditionally supported and prioritized as important by females:  education spending, 
child health insurance, welfare benefits, and child support payments.   
Does the growth of female descriptive representation in the state legislature have 
an influence on these particular policy areas?  Are females who are “incorporated” into 
the political institution, serving as committee chairs and in leadership positions in the 
state legislature, such as speaker of the house or majority leader, necessary to the 
outcome of these policies?  Is being a member of the liberal governing coalition a 
condition for influence over these policy issues?  Or, does the Democratic Party 
typically respond to these issues in governing bodies thus negating any additional female 
influence?  These questions led to the research question for this work:  Does an increase 
in female descriptive representation, institutional mechanisms of influence, or other 
political conditional factors lead to better substantive representation of female group 
salient issues?   
This research project will be examined through seven Chapters.  Chapter II 
reviews the literature on descriptive representation with a discussion of its comparison to 
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substantive representation. This chapter discusses levels of government and support for 
female descriptive representation.  Also, a discussion of issues typically most important 
to females in the population (female group salient issues) as well as female’s legislative 
priorities will be discussed providing support for the selection of the four dependent 
variables.  The dynamics of state legislatures, the hierarchy of leadership positions, and 
policymaking processes will be addressed and finally, females’ leadership styles to show 
how an increase in the number of females in leadership positions could affect the 
dynamic of decision making in state legislatures. 
 Chapter III reviews the theoretical models used in this work:  The Presence 
Model, the three institutional incorporation models -- Simple Incorporation Model, 
Specific Institutional Incorporations Model, and Broad Institutional Incorporation 
Model -- and the Party as a Substantive Representative Model.  After developing these 
models as the basis for empirical analysis in my research, the hypotheses tested for each 
of the four dependent variables are presented:  per pupil education expenditures, 
children without health insurance, welfare benefits, and child support collection. All the 
variables are discussed and support for their selection provided.  Finally, the data utilized 
for this study is provided and the Ordinary Least Squared Model used to estimate the 
coefficients is explained.   
 Chapters IV through VII are devoted to one of the specific dependent variables in 
this study.  The models are run on these dependent variables to test effects of female 
descriptive representation and incorporation.  The results are presented to determine if 
support exists for the models.  Chapter IV will reveal the results for the variable, per 
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pupil education expenditures, Chapter V, child health insurance coverage, Chapter VI, 
welfare benefits, and Chapter VII, child support collection.  The final chapter will be a 
summary and discussion of the major findings in the work, the contribution this work 
has made to the literature, and concluding remarks about how this topic can be further 
expanded.   
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
“Representation is a core concept in the study and practice of politics.  It is about 
who represents, what is represented, and how it is represented” (Galligan 2007, 557).  If 
representation is core to how we study politics, then we must examine the individuals 
who represent us.  Pitkin (1967) was one of the first to identify the four distinct, but 
interconnected, meanings or dimensions of representation:  formal, descriptive, 
substantive, and symbolic.  Descriptive representation, or “representativeness”, refers to 
the “compositional similarity between the representatives and the represented” (10-11) 
or meaning that the composition of the representative institution should mirror the 
composition of the represented.  Substantive representation refers to “acting in the 
interests of the represented in a manner responsive to them (209).”  The most common 
interpretation of this is that policy responsiveness should meet the needs or demands of 
citizens (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2007).   
While works cite Pitkin for her study of the integral parts of representation, many 
also ignore the concept that Pitkin believed these should be studied together and choose 
one or two parts to study (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2007).  This study specifically is 
interested in female descriptive representation and whether an increase in female 
representatives leads to substantive representation of female group salient issues.  This 
study will not integrate the other theoretical approaches to studying representation, but it 
will incorporate more to the study of descriptive and substantive representation than has 
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been done in previous work by examining not only the number of female 
representatives, but also institutional leadership positions as well as the conditioning 
effect of political parties in state legislatures.   
Gender politics literature has always stressed how important it is to elect more 
women to public office in order to adequately represent females and the political issues 
they find most important.  Pitkin considered substantive representation to be the most 
important dimension of her model and numerous scholars still consider it to be a central 
focus to the study of representation.  Growing evidence in the gender and representation 
literature leads to the conclusion that “female representatives, in particular, but not 
exclusively, have found to identify with promoting a more gender-equal society” 
(Galligan 2007, 557).  Female legislators are more likely to promote legislation 
addressing women’s economic and social issues, especially issues concerning health 
care, poverty, and education (Carroll 1994; Dodson 1998; Flammang 1997; Thomas 
1994; Thomas and Welch 1991) and, in some cases, they take a different approach to 
legislating and leadership, communicating differently and working cooperatively with 
their male counterparts (Rosenthal 1998; Kathlene 1994; Swers 2002; Thomas 1994).  
Overall, women in public office are more likely to address political issues important to 
females in society and provide a different approach to legislating.  This literature reveals 
that women better represent women.  At the same time, there is research indicating 
electing women to office does not lead to better substantive representation of female 
group salient issues.  Women may act as isolated legislators and not represent the female 
“group perspective” (Phillips 1995; Weldon 2002).  One of the goals of this research is 
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to show the female representative’s role in promoting female group salient issues while 
recognizing other factors that affect policymaking at the state legislative level.   
Males and females are politically different in a number of ways.  Research of 
these differences has studied opinion differences, voting differences, and the gender gap.  
What does that mean to this study?  This research is interested in male and female state 
legislators and the differences in their influence over policy.  The literature review is 
organized around specific areas related to this focus to help better understand where we 
are today in studying male and female officeholders. 
This chapter reviews the literature on descriptive versus substantive 
representation and the levels of government where females are influential.  Secondly, 
female group salient issues and the differences between males and females’ opinions of 
these issues are addressed.  Third, female and male legislators’ prioritization of political 
issues is discussed.  Finally, the structure of state legislatures and policymaking is 
reviewed to understand the dynamics in how policy is formulated in state legislatures.  
This will lead to a discussion of differences in female leadership styles.  Understanding 
state legislative policymaking and the hierarchy of decision making aids in 
understanding what women face as they increase their numbers and incorporation into 
the policymaking body and try to influence public policy. 
DESCRIPTIVE V SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION 
As argued by John Stuart Mill more than a century ago and supported by Pitkin 
in her work on representation, the composition of the legislative body has an influence 
on policy outputs (1967).  There is an importance between the percentage of females in 
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the legislature and public policy representing women’s interests.  A large amount of 
literature on women serving in the legislature focuses on descriptive versus substantive 
representation and the importance of the connection between the two (Mansbridge 1999; 
Phillips 1995; Sapiro 1981).  Research supports the argument that an increase in female 
representation will lead to an increase in substantive representation, or women will not 
only “stand for” women but also “act for” women (Pitkin 1967; Carroll 2000).  This 
argument leads to a number of questions about whether females are better 
representatives of females and whether a female legislator acts for females inside and 
outside her respective district.   
Mansbridge (1999) addresses these questions with a form of representation she 
calls “surrogate representation.”  Mansbridge suggests, 
 In practice, it seems that legislators’ feelings or responsibility for constituents 
outside their districts are considerably stronger when the legislature features few, 
or disproportionately few, representatives of the group in question….The sense 
of surrogate responsibility is also particularly strong when the surrogate 
representative shares experiences with surrogate constituents in a way that a 
majority of the legislature does not (1988, 11). 
She does not argue that surrogate representatives have to be descriptive representatives.  
However, she argues that descriptive representatives, being members of the subordinate 
group, help “circumvent the strong barriers to communication between dominant and 
subordinate groups” (1999, 642). In other words, female legislators act as better 
surrogates to females in society in general. 
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Female legislators express a commitment to representing women and their 
concerns.  They also believe they are representatives of women and consider women as a 
group an important reelection constituency.  These female legislators believe they are 
uniquely equipped to handle concerns from their female constituents (Reingold 1992).  
Female Congresswomen have reflected on their role and expressed a deep concern for 
women within and outside their constituency.  Barbara Boxer (D-CA), once said in an 
interview “…women from all over the country really do follow what you do and rely on 
you to speak out for them on issues of women’s health care, reproductive choice, 
condition of families, domestic priorities…” (1995).   Eva Clayton, reflecting on her role 
as a U.S. Representative, said “I have women all over the state say, ‘You are my 
congresswoman’…they identify with my presence here…and that adds, I think, an 
extraordinary opportunity, but I think it also adds a worthy burden that one has to be 
responsive [to] and responsible for” (1995).  As Reingold suggests in her study of 
legislator’s predispositions, “the female officials were more likely to accept the link 
between descriptive and substantive representation of women – the link between being a 
woman and actively representing women’s concerns – than their male colleagues were to 
reject such a link” (1992, 531). The same is true for female state legislators.  Most will 
do work aimed at helping women, and they will prioritize legislation that deals with 
women’s issues.  One of the challenges of this study is being able to define women’s 
issues and address the question of whether all women care about the same issues. Female 
group salient issues, how they are identified, and priority women give to certain political 
issues are addressed in a later section of this chapter.   
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While there is evidence female lawmakers believe they better represent the 
female group perspective, there is also evidence that an increase in descriptive 
representation does not always increase substantive representation.  Phillips (1995) 
makes the argument that increasing the number of women in elected office does not 
guarantee greater substantive representation because “representation depends on the 
continuing relationship between representatives and the represented” (82).  For Phillips, 
there is no way to establish accountability to women as a group.  Weldon argues female 
legislators act as “isolated individuals” and rely on their own experiences and opinions 
when making public policy decisions.  Therefore, improving substantive representation 
would require that the representatives be able to “articulate the group perspective” 
(2002, 1157-58).  Additionally, a number of surveys done of black legislators reveal no 
better responsiveness to black interests as a result of the increase in black descriptive 
representation (Hedge, Button, and Spears 1996; Critizer 1998; DeWeever 2000; 
Layman 1993). 
While some results are mixed, female lawmakers have indicated through 
interviews and through the study of bill sponsorships they focus on substantively 
representing females in their state or throughout the nation.  Representative Marge 
Roukema (R-NJ) “insisted that she ‘hadn’t wanted to’ take on women’s and family 
issues….she had ‘fought it’...I learned very quickly that if the women like me in 
Congress were not going to attend to some of these family concerns…they weren’t going 
to be attended to” (July 20, 1995; Carroll 2000).  Carroll suggests that being a surrogate 
representative for women is what it means to be a female officeholder and this 
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responsibility is the norm, rather than the exception in this historical moment (2000).  In 
2001, lawmakers overwhelmingly said that the “increased presence of women has made 
a difference in the extent to which legislators consider how legislation will affect women 
as a group as well as in the number of bills passed dealing specifically with the problems 
faced by women” (“Women State Legislators” 2001).  
While there is much evidence in the literature that female representatives better 
represent women’s political and public policy interests, other forms of representation can 
also explain how individuals are represented.  Pitkin’s work identified two other types of 
representation, formal representation and symbolic representation.  She believed that the 
study of representation included all four of the dimensions or an integrated structure of 
representation:  formal, descriptive, substantive, and symbolic.  Formal representation 
refers to the institutional rules and procedures related to the selection of representatives 
and symbolic representation refers to the feelings by those being represented.  It does not 
matter who the representative is or what they do, it is all about how they are perceived 
and evaluated by who they represent. According to Pitkin, in order for an institution to 
be representative, it must achieve a minimum on all dimensions of representation (1967; 
Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). In their work examining 31 representative 
democracies, Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler find strong interconnections between these 
dimensions.  The “formal representative structure and processes exert powerful 
influences on the extent of women’s descriptive representation, policy responsiveness, 
and symbolic representation” (2005, 424).  Further, while gains in policy responsiveness 
can be achieved with few women in office, “real” gains may be dependent on women 
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achieving a critical mass (Childs and Krook 2008; Kanter 1977; Schwindt-Bayer and 
Mishler 2005).  As the proportions within a group “begin to shift so do social 
experiences” because as their numbers increase, they can become allies, form coalitions, 
and affect the culture of the group (Kanter 1977, 207).  Female lawmakers will not have 
considerable policy impact until they move from a few token legislators to a minority of 
all legislators.  Only then women may be able to influence female group salient issues 
and influence their male colleagues to support the legislation (Childs and Krook 2008).   
Other scholars have found an increase in the critical mass level may actually 
decrease a female’s likelihood to advocate on behalf of group salient issues (Carroll 
2001). Further, studies reveal conditions that may lead to female legislators having 
policy success outside of simply reaching a certain percentage in the legislature, or a 
critical mass (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007).  Identifying the threshold between 
numbers that are too small and too large is problematic as well as lack of evidence that 
just increases in numbers of female legislators will impact policy-making for female 
interests (Crowley 2004).    Also, an increase in the number of women could create a 
backlash among their male colleagues, hinder bipartisan legislative work, or it could 
mean more women in the legislature who are not motivated to act for women (Carroll 
2001; Childs and Krook 2008). 
Mansbridge studied different types of representation and while she finds support 
for descriptive and substantive representation, she also argues that promissory 
representation has an impact on legislative behavior.  Promissory representation is how 
she defines the traditional form of representation.  Candidates make promises to 
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constituents during the campaign and then the representative is either able to keep or fail 
to keep these promises.  To be accountable in promissory representation, the 
representative is “responsible to….answerable to…bound…bound by” those voters 
(Mansbridge 2003; Pitkin 1967).   
Level of Descriptive Representation Influence 
There is a significant amount of scholarly work examining the level of 
government where descriptive representation has the most influence.  Most of the work 
determining the influence of women on policy focused its attention on the states because 
more women serve as state legislators than as members of Congress.  In multistate and 
longitudinal studies of single legislatures, the evidence indicates women do have more 
liberal policy attitudes and voting records than their male colleagues and they exhibit a 
greater commitment to the pursuit of feminist initiatives and legislation incorporating 
issues that traditionally concern women, such as health, education and welfare (Dolan 
and Ford 1995; Dodson and Carroll 1991; Thomas 1994).
2
  Women are also more likely 
to make sure their policy proposals are passed into law (Thomas 1994).  Findings also 
reveal that as women increased their numbers, the policy priority differences intensified.  
The more women in the legislature, the more likely they were to pursue policy based on 
gender.  However, once this number reaches a “critical mass”, it appears that intensity 
wanes (Berkmann and O’Connor 1993; Thomas 1994).  Some would argue that when 
women comprise more than 30 percent (sometimes the number needs to be at least 40 
percent) they are too numerous to be considered a “cohesive group” and thus being 
                                                 
2
 A more detailed discussion of women’s group salient issues will be addressed in the next section.   
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female or male becomes less important to the legislators (Reingold 1992).  In the case of 
state legislatures, women have not reached that level in the majority of the state 
legislatures since the overall average is only right above 20 percent.  In a survey done in 
2001, 85 percent of both Democrat and Republican female legislators agreed they have 
the responsibility to represent women’s interests.  These female representatives indicate 
they work on legislation intended to benefit women (“Women State Legislators” 2001).  
Therefore, it is clear female legislators feel that they should act for women, so this study 
is important because it can clearly test that notion to determine if the female legislators 
are doing this in the states. 
There is much stronger evidence in support of descriptive representation with the 
study of local governing boards, specifically the study of race.  Meier and Stewart (1991; 
see also Stewart, England and Meier 1989 and Meier, et al. 2005) found that the increase 
in black and Latino school board members led to an influence on public policy.  This 
was due in part to the smaller size of the legislature, better policy measures at that 
governing level, and less structure, rules, and partisanship that are evident at the state 
legislative level that can undermine the minority influence.  In an analysis of black 
legislators, the increase in the presence of blacks in the legislature neither affected their 
perceptions of having greater influence nor increased responsiveness to black interests 
(Critizer 1998; DeWeezer 2000; Layman 1993).
3
  Clearly, there is a greater complexity 
of the legislatures at the state and national level (Preuhs 2006) and with smaller 
                                                 
3
 During the 1980s, the percentage of African Americans in the state legislatures increased to about 8 
percent compared to a population of about 11-12 percent in the United States (Joint Center for Political 
and Economic Studies and National Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org).     
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legislative bodies, the impact of one member will be greater (Meier, et al 2005).  
Flammang (1985) in her study of county supervisors in Santa Clara, California, found 
women were more likely to speak out and participate in the policy-making process when 
there was a supportive colleague present, which is more likely to occur in a small 
governing body.  Further, females were most likely to only pursue an issue on their 
legislative agenda if they felt they had  enough support, rather than pushing an issue that 
was likely to fail. 
At the national level, there is also support for descriptive and substantive 
representation.  Women in Congress are sponsoring and co-sponsoring more legislation 
concerning women’s roles as caregivers (Swers 2000; Vega and Firestone 1995) and 
they are using their positions on committees to advocate for female group salient issues 
into legislation (Dodson 1998; Swers 2000).  Further, more female members of Congress 
are participating in floor debates on women’s issues (Swers 2000; Dodson, et al. 1995).  
Some work, similar to the work in local governing bodies, has been done with what is 
referred to as new institutional research on Congress.  Female members of Congress 
began adapting to the institutional norms in Congress and used them to enhance their 
policy priorities.  They would use their positions on committees to make sure that gender 
related policies, like violence against women, reproductive rights, and women’s health, 
did not fail because of lack of time for debate or funding for the issue (Dodson et al 
1995). This research found the absence of women from the key committees dealing with 
women’s issues inhibited women’s efforts (Norton 1994, 1995, 1999).  Further, by using 
their positions as party leaders, female members of Congress were able to make sure 
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their policy priorities got on the party’s national agenda.  There were cases, however, 
that other factors affected Congresswomen’s actions and decision making.  When 
examining the importance of majority versus minority party status, Republican female 
members of Congress changed their sponsorship on either social welfare bills or feminist 
policy in order to advance their position as a member of the majority party (Swers 2000). 
Descriptive representation is not always popular in the literature.  “No one would 
argue that morons should be represented by morons” (Pennock 1979, 314).  Simply 
having a similarity or identity with constituents does not necessarily have anything to do 
with what the representative does and some have concluded that descriptive 
representation does little to support substantive representation of women (Diamond 
1977; Swain 1993; Young 1997).  In order to have a representative democracy, 
constituents’ substantive interests must be represented.  If “nondescriptive” 
representatives can best represent the substantive interests of their constituents, then 
descriptive representation does not have a leg to stand on (Mansbridge 1999).  However, 
descriptive representation can provide political legitimacy making members of the 
historically underrepresented groups feel like they are being represented (Phillips 1995). 
What we have learned from previous research is that the increase in the number 
of females and minorities in these governing bodies is important.  But when the 
governing body is so large, like state legislatures, the numbers of female or minority 
representatives would have to increase more in order to see significant influence.  
Looking at historical trends, that is not likely to happen in the near future. The increase 
in the number of women in state legislative positions stopped in the late 1990s after two 
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decades of gains.  The result is little change in the number of women in these governing 
bodies since that time but, women have gained seniority in these chambers and have 
increased their numbers in leadership positions (Carroll 2004). Therefore, rather than 
being concerned with numbers or just conducting interviews of these representatives, the 
obvious next step in research would be to look at the structure of the legislatures and the 
dynamics of power over legislation, as has been done somewhat with the studies on 
Congress.   
The findings and explanation of different types of representation are important to 
this study because while it is a replication of another work, they have implications for 
future research in this area.  This study will focus on only descriptive and substantive 
representation.  Since in most states, the number of females in the legislatures across the 
country has not reached the critical mass level as suggested in the literature (Kanter 
1977; Childs and Krook 2008), the representation of women’s issues may be the result of 
the political parties taking up these issues or male legislators increasing their support of 
these issues to gain more support from female voters.  Further, this study is not 
addressing formal and symbolic representation but as Pitkin suggests, these four 
dimensions may need to be addressed together to get the full effects of female 
representation.  Also, with this work, campaign promises or legislative agenda of the 
representative is not accounted for but could have implications for future research in this 
area.  What is interesting about this study is while there is support in the literature for 
female descriptive representatives, this study can test the assertion that nondescriptive 
representatives may best represent their constituents.  If the number of female 
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legislators, the female committee chairs, and females in leadership positions don’t have 
influence on female group salient issues, maybe the male representatives are addressing 
those concerns.  
During the 1990s and early 2000s, women made inroads into leadership positions 
in the state legislatures.  By 2003, about 13 percent of all top legislative leadership 
positions in state legislatures and almost 19 percent of standing committee chairs across 
the country were held by women (Carroll 2004).  It is at that point, one can determine 
whether the influence is coming from the number of females or their institutional power 
they possess.  There are so many factors in the state legislatures that can lead to policy 
influence and it is important to examine a number of these, as Preuhs did in his work, in 
order to determine how best female group salient issues can be addressed.  It is 
important to dig deeper into the role of the institutional structure and conditional affects 
that party plays in the policymaking process. 
FEMALE GROUP SALIENT ISSUES 
In the nineteenth century, “male politicians argued that they knew what was in 
women’s best interest” so there was no need for women in politics (Hawkesworth 2001).  
In the 1960s, women’s rights activists also argued that women had a fixed set of 
interests.  However, women differ from one another in the population in terms of race, 
socioeconomic background, education, marital status, and party affiliation, just to name 
a few.  Further, women do not always agree on what constitutes women’s interests or 
female group salient issues which makes identifying these issues challenging (2001).  
There is, however, evidence from public opinions polling and interviews of male and 
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female legislators over the years revealing trends in the gender gap in policy issues and 
prioritization of these issues.  
Carol Gilligan believed women had a distinctive voice based on relationship and 
caring:  a “different voice” (1982b).    Different than men, a woman approaches decision 
making by considering others.  “The phrase ‘a different voice’ implies to some that 
women are a cohesive group that think and act alike despite class, race, and other status 
attributes…at a minimum, a different voice means being different from…men in a 
consistent, predictable way” (Kelly, Saint-Germain and Horn’s 1991, 19).   Women 
possess many varied political interests but are also widely perceived as sharing common 
interests that are salient to women as a group (Sapiro 1981).  One must recognize that 
women are a diverse group along lines of races, ethnicity, class, etc., and while they may 
not agree on exactly what women’s interests are, they are likely to have political 
opinions that are distinguishable from men (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2007).  
Through survey research over the years, women in society are found to favor social 
policies more than men, are more compassionate than men (Gilligan 1982a, 1982b), and 
are less driven by “pocketbook” concerns (Chaney, Alvarez and Nagler 1998; Welch and 
Hibbing 1992). “Women are more supportive of social spending; men of tax cutting” 
(Alvarez and McCaffery 2003, 16).  In recent decades, especially during the time period 
of this study, women are more supportive of government programs, government action, 
and government intervention than men (The Gender Gap 1997; Schlesinger and 
Heldman 2000).  Even women running for public office are perceived as being more 
competent than men in the areas of “improving our education system” and “dealing with 
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health problems” (Rosenwasser, et al. 1987; Shapiro 1981) and better at deadline with 
social issues than men (Men or Women: Who’s the Better Leader? 2008).  
Surveys of government officials have consistently found that female legislators 
place higher priority than males on women, children and family issues and they will 
introduce bills that concern these issues (Chaney, Alvarez and Nagler 1998; Thomas 
1991; Thomas and Welch 1991).  Typically, women more strongly support government 
spending programs because of their more compassionate stance on issues than men 
(Gilligan 1982a, 1982b; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986).  Men are much more often than 
women to prioritize issues dealing with business and economics (Thomas 1991; Thomas 
and Welch 1991).  Previous research found a true gender gap in policy exists on social 
welfare spending and social issues (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999).  Due to the female’s 
historically disadvantaged position in society, they tend to advocate for social programs 
designed to help women, and the underprivileged, and they will support a more activist 
government in these areas (Carroll 1988, 2003).
4
  Because of the female’s traditional 
role as the primary caregiver, they tend to be more sensitive than men to the 
consequences that social policies have for individuals (Carroll 1988; Gidengil 1995).  
For example, in reaction to Reagan’s domestic social policy in the 1980s (Kaufmann and 
Petrocik 1999; Piven 1985), women believed the government had a responsibility to 
“provide services, ensure jobs and living standards, and health care” (Shapiro and 
Mahajan 1986, Gilens 1988, Chaney, Alvarez and Nagler 1998).  The support by 
females of social welfare spending programs was a result of the beneficiaries of these 
                                                 
4
During the time period covered in this study, the literature reveals that females continue to advocate for 
programs designed to help these groups (1982-2002). 
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programs primarily being female.  Further, Reagan’s attempt to cut these programs, in 
order to reduce taxes, had much more appeal to males, thus resulting in a gender gap 
over these issues (Howell and Day 2000).  
Equally important to consider is not only the attitudinal differences of males and 
females but also how much importance they place on particular issues where they differ 
(salience of the issue).  Surveys of the general public illustrate these differences.  Social 
welfare spending and social issues, and the salience of these issues, are found to be one 
of the strongest predictors of behavior for females and males, with females favoring 
social welfare spending more than males.  Females are consistently different from males 
in their opinions of programs that help African-Americans and their desired level of 
government services (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999).  Females identify more with other 
disadvantaged groups, including ethnic and racial minorities and are more supportive of 
public assistance for minorities than males (Cook and Wilcox 1991; Gilens 1987).   
FEMALES’ LEGISLATIVE PRIORITIES 
If one accepts the argument that female descriptive representation leads to 
substantive representation for females, we have to know how women prioritize policy 
issues and how they  behave while serving in the legislature.  In other words, what do 
they bring to the legislature that is different from men?   
In interviews of legislators, they have identified their responsibilities and 
priorities with legislation.  Women legislators give greater priority to women’s issues 
than their male colleagues at both state and national levels, actively promote legislation 
to improve women’s status in society, and focus their legislative attention on issues such 
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as health care, the welfare of family and children, and education (Dodson and Carroll 
1991; Carroll 1994; Thomas 1991; Thomas 1994; Thomas and Welch 1991; Tamerius 
1995; Flammang 1997; Carroll 2000; Carroll 2001; Carroll 2003).  In The Center for 
American Women and Politics (CAWP) 2001 study of male and female state senators 
and representatives, women legislators were found to be much more active than their 
male colleagues in promoting women’s rights legislation (“Women State Legislators 
2001; see also Vega and Firestone 1995).  Female legislators revealed that their top 
priority bill’s purpose was to expand women’s opportunities and/or protect the rights of 
women, and further, significantly larger proportions of women than men worked on 
legislation to benefit women (Carroll 2003, 8-9).    
There are studies comparing women in Congress and their role in Washington to 
what is known at the state level.  Carroll (2000) examined the 103
rd
 and 104
th
 Congress 
and focused on the impact of members of Congress on various policy areas by 
interviewing members.  Her results indicate that Congresswomen believed they had a 
responsibility to all women in order to best represent them and this opinion tends to be 
the “norm, rather than the exception” (11).  She argues this attitude can do a lot for 
women’s issues, largely because female members of Congress feel that they are 
“surrogate representatives” for women (11).  This perception of her role affected her 
vote on policy issues.  Dolan (1997) examined the 103
rd
 Congress to determine whether 
female members of Congress responded to women through public policy.  She also 
found support for female members of Congress being more supportive of women’s 
issues than their male colleagues. 
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Why do female legislators give greater priority to women’s issues than their male 
colleagues?  Katzenstein shows feminism continues to exist and “women inside the 
major institutions of our society have found new strategies, tailored to their institutional 
context, to press forward with feminist demands” (1998).  Rather than holding protests 
outside of governing institutions, women are now involved in feminist activities within 
the governing bodies.  Carroll (2003) finds that many women legislators “are closely 
connected to networks that provide access to the … group perspective” (1).  Both 
feminist identity and women’s organizations lead to greater accountability between 
women legislators and women in the electorate.  Accountability to women’s issues is 
also found in identity, or females being able to identify with other women as a group.  
Most feminists feel “internally accountable” to the women’s movement (Carroll 2003, 
2), which is not a set of organizations but more of a “discourse” (Mansbridge 1995).  
Mansbridge defines this as “a set of changing, contested aspirations, and understandings 
that provide conscious goals, cognitive backing, and emotional support for each 
individual’s evolving feminist identity” (1995, 27).  She believes accountability to the 
women’s movements/discourse through identity is different from descriptive 
representation because it requires women thinking collectively, and thinking in terms of 
the group perspective is important to substantive representation.  This is important 
because it reinforces “feminist identity” and supports “women legislators’ policy-related 
actions on behalf of women” (Carroll 2003, 3).   
What about female lawmakers who do not consider themselves feminists?  
Carroll addresses this issue with her reference to a “closet feminist” (1984).  She argues 
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that female lawmakers are committed to women’s issues and goals of the women’s 
movement but are less likely to make that public while campaigning because it may be a 
liability to them and it may narrow their appeal.  While all women may not label 
themselves as feminist, many will share those goals (Carroll 2003).  In a study of 
Congress in the mid-1990s, Hawkesworth, et al, found that “Democratic and Republican 
women legislators of widely differing ideological views and  representing markedly 
different constituents seek to promote legislation they believe will serve women and are 
willing to cooperate across party lines to accomplish their legislative objectives for 
women” (2001, 4).  Typically, Democratic female legislators are more likely to work on 
advancing women’s issues.  But, even as recent as 1988, Republican female legislators 
were more likely than Democratic female legislators to work on legislation to help 
women (“Women State Legislators” 2001).  
Other factors may affect a female lawmaker’s actions and decision making which 
can conflict with their goals to advance women’s issues.    Recent work of Republican 
female members of Congress revealed that they will change their sponsorship on either 
social welfare bills or feminist policy in order to advance their position as a member of 
the majority party (Swers 2000).  Further, in a highly ideologically polarized political 
environment, collaboration between Democratic and Republican female legislators can 
be hindered.  For example, in the 104
th
 Congress (1995-1996), the new Republican 
majority was less sympathetic to bipartisan action among female lawmakers, they had 
fewer ties with women’s rights groups outside of Congress, and they eliminated the 
Congressional Caucus for Women’s Issues (Hawkesworth, et al, 2001).   
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There is also the evidence of promissory representation when females must be 
accountable to their constituents and campaign promises.  If that theory is supported, 
supporting the female group perspective may conflict with constituent demands.  These 
factors have implications for this research and future research in the area of female 
descriptive representation to be discussed in the conclusion. 
DYNAMICS OF STATE LEGISLATURES AND HIERARCHY OF LEADERSHIP 
 Comparative analysis of state legislatures is relatively easy in the United States 
since almost all states have the same basic structure.  A brief description of the dynamics 
of state legislatures, the hierarchy of leadership, and an explanation of policymaking will 
help set the stage for the discussion of female leadership style and how it differs from 
males. 
 Individuals and groups can gain influence over legislation in two ways.  First, by 
being appointed to a powerful position and secondly, by being appointed to and 
participating in committee work (Endersby and McCurdy 1996; Kathlene 1994).  Each 
state legislative branch is structured to provide a hierarchy of leaders.
5
  With the House 
of Representatives, the members select a Speaker of the House who not only presides 
over the legislation session, but in many states, has a very powerful position for a 
number of reasons.  First, the speaker helps select, or in some cases exclusively selects, 
the chair and membership on standing committees in the house.  These standing 
committees are the groups of people who determine the fate of a piece of legislation.  In 
some states, up to ninety percent of bills die in committee so the members who serve 
                                                 
5
 The titles of leaders can vary by state and the discussion provided is describing the state legislative 
leadership in general terms. 
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have a very important role (Tanahill 1995).  Therefore, naming the members on the 
committee and the chair can give the speaker a lot of influence over legislation.  All 
members know that “being in good graces of the party leader is certainly important in 
getting on major committees” (Goodwin 1959).  Secondly, the speaker, in many states, 
assigns members to a calendar committee, which determines when a bill will be 
scheduled (or if it will be scheduled) for debate.  In some states, the speaker serves as the 
individual who does the scheduling.  Either way, this is an additional layer of influence 
over legislation. Finally, the speaker of the house can determine whether a bill will be 
debated on the house floor.  The Speaker is almost always a member of the majority 
party in the house so his or her responsibilities, as well as the support from his or her 
party, can garner much influence over legislation (Tannahill 2005).   
 Assisting the speaker with his or her duties is the assistant speaker of the house 
and speaker pro tem, who presides over the house debate in place of the speaker.  These 
two individuals can also be very helpful to the speaker and be an ally in helping him or 
her push forth their policy agenda.  The majority leader also serves to assist the speaker 
in shoring up support from their party to help successfully pass legislation or help ensure 
that bills do not pass the house.  The minority leader in the senate serves the minority 
party (Tanahill 2005).   
 The Senate operates in a similar fashion as the house but since the senate is 
typically smaller in number, it is a less structured legislative body, less formal with rules 
and procedures, and seniority and specialization norms are not frequently enforced, thus 
giving leaders in the senate less power over legislation (Endersby and McCurdy 1996).  
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The lieutenant governor is typically elected as the leader of the senate and is very 
influential over legislation.  He or she typically has the same responsibilities as the 
speaker but since it an elected position, he/she does not necessarily serve as the leader of 
the party.  He does usually have the power to appoint committee members and chairs 
and determine if legislation will be debated on the senate floor, etc.  The president of the 
senate is the position held by the leader of the party and selected by senators.  He or she 
typically presides over the senate debate and may have a role in assigning committee 
membership and chairs (Tanahill 2005).  To assist the president of the senate, the 
president pro-tem helps with the responsibilities.  Also, majority leaders serve in the 
same role for the senate as the majority leader in the house.  The minority leader in the 
senate serves the minority party (Tanahill 2005). 
State Legislative Policymaking 
“Congress in its committee-rooms is Congress at work” (Wilson 1913, 79).  As 
mentioned, being appointed to a committee and participating in committee work gives 
legislators great influence over legislation and control over their legislative agenda 
(Endersby and McCurdy 1996; Kathlene 1994; Munger 1988).  Both the full committee 
and subcommittee work has been recognized by state and congressional scholars as 
being extremely important to the legislative process (Evan 1991; Francis 1989).  Francis 
(1982, 1989) did comparative work on the fifty states and found similarities among 
them.  The House and the Senate, despite the institutional norms, have much in common.  
Legislative work is done in committee, the committee specializes in a certain policy 
area, and members work for assignments to certain committees to help them control the 
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policy, advance their agenda, and accomplish their legislative goals (Endersby and 
McCurdy 1996; Munger 1988; Schiller 1995).  Legislators spend the majority of their 
time working with legislation as opposed to constituency service or legislative oversight 
(Masters 1961; Francis 1989).  The main focus is committee work and sponsoring 
legislation.  Committee work tends to take up the majority of the legislator’s time due to 
the volume of legislation that must pass through committee.  Members’ policy interests 
as well as their institutional influence and ambition for higher office can influence their 
goals in getting on certain legislative committees (Fenno 1973; Hibbing 1986).  
Members work hard to gain favor with the leadership in the House and the Senate in 
order to be appointed to certain committees, especially the powerful ones (Masters 
1961).   
The committee system is devised to do most of the work in state legislatures.  
Once the membership and chair are in position, any bill that is introduced into the house 
or senate is assigned by the chamber leadership to one of these committees, who has 
jurisdiction over the topic of the legislation.  For example, education bills would be 
assigned to the education committee. However, some committees have overlapping 
jurisdictions so the chamber leadership would have the ability to assign a bill to a 
“friendly” or “unfriendly” committee (Ginsberg, Lowi and Weir 2011, 844) giving the 
chamber leader significant power over legislation.  The reason these committees become 
so important is they do most of the work on the bill.  First, they have the power to amend 
or re-write the legislation.  Technically, it could go to the committee “looking” one way 
and come out looking totally different.  Typically this is done by amending the 
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legislation to make changes any way the committee sees fit.  Secondly, the committee is 
able to hold hearings on the bill and ask anyone they want to hear from to testify in favor 
of or in opposition to the bill.  So, if the chair supports the bill, he/she may ask 
individuals supporting the bill to testify in hopes of influencing the committee 
membership.  If he/she opposes the bill, the same thing may happen with individuals 
opposed to the legislation.  Finally, the committee takes the vote to determine whether 
the bill will move out of committee.  As will be discussed further in the next section, 
women approach leadership in different ways and have different styles of leadership 
which can be a factor when determining a female legislator’s influence over committee 
work.  Kathlene (1990, 1991) found that female committee chairs were most likely to 
use their position as a facilitator of committee discussion rather than trying to control or 
direct the debate.  Therefore, whether giving women this position of power on a 
committee yields great influence over legislation will be addressed in this study. 
The entire legislative structural dynamic is set up so the majority party generally 
holds the power.  First, the majority party holds the most seats thus giving them the most 
votes.  Second, the majority party typically selects the leadership for the chamber who is 
responsible for the path of legislation.  Third, the leadership selects the committee 
membership and chair and assigns the bills to committee, thus being able to “stack the 
deck” in their favor.  Finally, the fate of a bill being placed on the chamber calendar for 
debate and vote is greatly influenced by the leadership in the chamber.   
This structure leads to a great amount of influence over legislation.  This 
explanation is important to this research because the question of female influence is 
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driving this study.  Would females holding these positions attempt to influence 
legislation that is typically important to females in society?  With the increase in female 
legislators, more females are holding these important positions in the legislature, thus 
increasing their chances of being influential over legislation.  Further, females are found 
to have different leadership styles than their male counterparts exerting additional 
influence.  The purpose of this study is to examine all the areas of influence given this 
legislative structure. 
Female Leadership Styles 
When examining female leadership styles, one must look at the bigger picture of 
perceptions of the legislators’ role.  Research indicates at the state and local level, 
female officials are perceived as being more responsive to constituents, more 
approachable, trustworthy, and better at communicating (Beck 1991; Flammang 1995) 
and appear more interested in hearing constituent input and addressing constituent 
concerns (Fox and Shuhmann 1999; Thomas 1991, 1994).  Further, if one examines bills 
that are a top priority for legislators
6
, the passage rate can be significantly higher female 
legislators than a bill of similar importance introduced by their male colleague (Thomas 
1991).  Women are exerting a greater level of effort and energy than men into the 
passage of legislation most important to them.  Therefore, one can expect that leadership 
styles would also be different given the perceptions of their overall role.   
                                                 
6
 In Thomas and Welch’s study (1991), the top priority bills were those identified by lawmakers as their 
top priority and bills they felt most proud of when asked about accomplishments (as well as committee 
assignments even though that is not completely voluntary). 
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In a legislature, individual lawmakers obtain influence through their 
appointment/election to leadership positions and through their appointment and 
participation in committee work.  Therefore, as more women move into these roles, they 
will have the opportunity to set the agenda and influence public policy on certain types 
of issues, possibly those important to women (Thomas and Welch 1991; Carroll 2003).  
Research shows women moving into leadership positions have faced a different 
environment than men (Dodson and Carroll 1991; Flammang 1985).  While the 
assumption would be that women would have advantages in these new roles, as their 
male colleagues had previously, research finds that female chairs did not always receive 
the same respect or influence in committee hearings as men (Yoder 1991; Kathlene 
1994).  Women used their leadership positions to include all voices while men 
interjected their own personal opinions and would try to dominate the discussion by 
cutting off speakers (Kathlene 1995; Walsh 2002).  Further, with an increase in females 
serving on the committees, the environment may actually become more hostile toward 
women because of this lack of respect and perceived influence (Yoder 1991).  This could 
obviously lead to a disadvantage in policymaking by female lawmakers.  “Gender, as 
described and applied in this literature, is a complex and interacting construct 
representing struggles over the use and definition of power, methods of managing 
conflict and building consensus, paths toward implementing change, and resistance by 
supporters of the status quo” (Kathlene 1994, 561). 
Research demonstrates women moving into leadership positions over the past 
few decades have different leadership styles than men (Dodson and Carroll 1991; 
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Flammang 1985; Men of Women: Who’s the Better Leader? 2008; Rosenthal 2002).  
Female committee chairs do not perceive their leadership positions the same as their 
male colleagues.  Females tend to lead more democratically, are likely to use their 
position as a facilitator or moderator rather than trying to control discussion and debate, 
and are more oriented toward consensus.  Men tend to lead more autocratically and 
attempt to control testimony, witnesses, and debate (Kathlene 1991, 1994, 1995; 
Rosenthal 2002).  Further, the perception of leadership traits also differs among men and 
women.  As leaders, women are perceived by the public to be more honest, intelligent, 
and compassionate.  Women are also are perceived to be better in public office at 
working our compromise, keeping government honest, representing constituent interests, 
and standing up for what they believe in (Men of Women: Who’s the Better Leader? 
2008).  While this study will examine both committee chairs and female leaders in the 
state legislature to determine their policy influence, it will not measure leadership style.  
However, the findings could lead to a discussion of female leadership style in the 
concluding chapter. 
WHAT REMAINS TO BE STUDIED 
Questions remain from the literature on descriptive representation and its 
influence leading to the research question for this work.  Does an increase in female 
descriptive representation, institutional mechanisms of influence, or other political 
conditional factors lead to better substantive representation of female group salient 
issues?   
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As noted in previous works, an increased presence of females or minority 
lawmakers does not always increase the legislative responsiveness to that group’s 
interests (Layman 1993; Phillips 1995; Hedge, Button, and Spears 1996; Critizer 1998; 
DeWeever 2000) even though female legislators claim to work on those group salient 
issues (Carroll 2003; Mansbridge 1995, 1999).  There is a missing element in those 
studies that does not consider the mechanisms of influence or conditional effects present 
in the given legislature suppressing this group influence. 
Preuhs (2006) conducted an important study on the conditional effects of 
minority descriptive representation in the state legislatures.  He revealed the positive 
influence of black legislators on state welfare benefit levels.  Preuhs believed previous 
works on black officeholders, which showed no impact, did not examine the 
mechanisms of influence of minority lawmakers.  He found that the presence of black 
legislators is not the only means of influencing policy, but he also found blacks serving 
as committee chairs and in leadership positions was a necessary condition for the 
influence of policy.  Additionally, when the Democratic Party was in control of the 
legislature, there was less recognizable influence of black legislators because liberal 
non-black legislators have similar policy preferences.  Therefore, the influence of black 
legislators was conditioned by the presence of a liberal governing coalition.  Finally, all 
of these “mechanisms are conditioned by the racialization of the political context” (585).  
When racial polarization dominates the political context, the mechanisms that would 
typically lead to policy influence are not present.  Policy preferences are reinforced by 
41 
 
racial cleavages and minority members’ views are marginalized by nonminority 
lawmakers (Preuhs 2006; Hawkesworth 2003).    
Preuhs’ work is unique, and the first of its kind, because it goes beyond the study 
of black descriptive representation and their policy influence and/or their influence in 
local governing bodies.  He argues that previous work did not account for the conditional 
effect of racialized political context and majority coalition membership.  He finds 
institutional positions at the state legislative level, leads to greater influence of minority 
legislators on policy issues than simply their presence in the legislature.  If one can find 
this influence with black representatives, the obvious next step would be to determine if 
these institutional and conditional effects are similar when examining female 
representation.   
This work will replicate much of Preuhs’ work by studying the conditional 
effects of female descriptive representation in the state legislature from 1983-2002 when 
all the states experienced a sharp increase in the number of female representatives with a 
leveling off in the mid-1990s (see the figure on page 46).  Since this study combines the 
influence of female descriptive representation with institutional mechanisms and 
conditioning effects, examining this time period is beneficial because as the number of 
females increased in the legislatures, the number of females serving as committee chairs 
and in leadership positions also increased (see the figures on pages 50 and 51).   
Therefore, this study is important and adds to the literature because it turns to 
state level data and accounts for all mechanisms of influence, as well as conditional 
effects of a liberal governing coalition, to determine whether female descriptive 
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representation exerts policy influence.  This influence may be with the presence of 
females in the legislature, females serving as committee chairs, females serving in 
institutional leadership positions (i.e. majority party leader, Speaker of the House, and/or 
Senate President), and the conditional effects of a majority governing coalition (the 
Democratic party control of the governorship and legislature in the state).   
Since this is a replication of Preuhs' study using gender instead of race, this study 
will replicate his models and hypotheses in order to determine whether the findings hold 
with gender.  At the same time, a number of different issues are not covered in his study 
that could provide more explanation on the influence of female legislators on female 
group salient issues. 
CONCLUSION 
 As the literature reveals, there is a need to study female descriptive 
representation and its effect on substantive representation of female group salient issues.  
The literature reveals the importance of females in governing bodies and their influence 
on policy outputs.  At the same time, there are scholars who find that female descriptive 
representation is not the most important type of representation to examine to determine if 
people are being represented.  Also, some research suggest that females act as isolated 
individuals and don’t represent the group perspective and pressure from political party 
leadership may lead female lawmakers away from representing women.   
Since females have increased their numbers in state legislatures over the past few 
decades, the time frame for this study is important.  While female increases at the state 
legislative level has flat-lined since the late 1990s, we have seen increases in the number 
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of females who are serving in leadership positions and  an increase in the number of 
female committee chairs.  The literature on state government hierarchy of leadership and 
dynamics of policymaking indicates individuals in party leadership roles and as 
committee chairs are important for influence over policy.  Therefore, studying not only 
the increase in females in state legislatures but also the increase in their roles in 
leadership positions and committee chairs, will help explain how much influence they 
can have and that has not been done before. 
 The following chapter will discuss the model and hypotheses tested for this study 
as well as explain the variables and data used.  Four empirical chapters will follow 
examining the results of the four dependent variables followed by a concluding chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL MODELS AND HYPOTHESES 
 
This study is a replication of previous work done by Robert Preuhs (2006), so the 
models and hypotheses are very similar.  The difference in this work is the independent 
variable using gender as its basis rather than race, but the same theory is applicable.  
This chapter will outline the theoretical models for this study, identify the data and 
describe the independent and dependent variables, and define the model used to estimate 
the coefficients.  
THEORETICAL MODELS 
Preuhs presented a number of different theoretical models in his work of how 
racial and ethnic descriptive representation is linked to policy influence (2006).  These 
same theoretical models will be used in this work as well as hypotheses derived from 
these models to determine how female descriptive representation is linked to policy 
influence.  In the case of this work, “descriptive representation refers to the 
representation of groups by individuals who share the same physical characteristics” 
(Preuhs 2006: 586; Pitkin 1967). 
The Presence Model 
 The presence model is the basic model developed to study descriptive 
representation and policy influence.  The model assumes (in the case of this study) 
female legislators act as stronger advocates for women’s interests than male legislators 
because they share unique experiences and backgrounds with female constituents 
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(Preuhs 2006; Bratton and Haynie 1999).  Paraphrasing Preuhs, adding female 
representatives “fosters governmental responsiveness to [women’s] groups by increasing 
the level of advocacy for their interests” (Preuhs, 2006, 586).  Preuhs reveals evidence in 
support of the presence model with minority representation found at the local school 
board level studying black and Latino board members.  The support of this model and 
increased responsiveness on issues is due to the smaller size of the legislatures, better 
policy measures at that level, and less structure, rules, and partnerships than at the state 
legislative level (Meier and Stewart 1991; Stewart, England and Meier 1989; Meier, et 
al. 2005; Meier 2008).  Simply, there is greater complexity of the legislatures at the state 
level (Preuhs 2006).  Preuhs revealed numerous studies have been done surveying black 
legislators and studying responsiveness to black interests and none reveal better policy 
responsiveness as a result of an increase in black descriptive representation (Hedge, 
Button, and Spears 1996; Critzer 1998; DeWeever 2000; Layman 1993).  The presence 
model will be tested using female descriptive representation in this study.  Further, since 
the presence model did not perform well outside local governing boards, other models 
will be tested to determine how female descriptive representation is linked to policy 
influence, specifically mechanisms of support and conditioning effects. 
To demonstrate the increased “presence” of females in elected office, Figure 1 
reveals the increase in females serving in the state legislature at the time of this study, 
the 1980s through the early 2000s.  Throughout the 1980s, the proportion of females in 
the state legislatures sharply increased with a leveling off after the 1990s (see Figure 1). 
In the early 1970s, females constituted about 4-5% of the state legislative membership 
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with a doubling of the percentage by the late 1970s.  Another interesting trend is the 
variation in the number of female legislators in each state.  In 2004, for example, 9.4  
 
 
 
 
percent of the legislature in South Carolina was female while females held 36.7 percent 
of the seats in the State of Washington.  Many of the lower percentages are in southern 
or border states.  Scholars who have examined the different patterns of representation 
among females in the states have found no simple explanation of this occurrence 
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FIGURE 1 FEMALE STATE LEGISLATORS, 1983-2002 
Note: Values represent mean percentage of female legislators by year.  N=980 (49 states, 20 
years, NE excluded).  Source: Center for American Women and Politics. 
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(Norrander and Wilcox 1998).   While there are a lot of similarities among state 
legislatures (leadership structure, committee structure, lawmaking process), there are a 
number of differences among the state legislatures (session length, number of 
committees, use of subcommittees, etc.) which complicates the comparative analysis.  
State legislatures also exhibit a high degree of stability and uniformity, as seen in 
committee work, legislation sponsorship, and the role of standing committees, which 
aids in the testing of the models in this work (Jewell 1989; Francis 1989; Patterson 
1996).  Most state legislatures are very partisan bodies with a hierarchical partisan 
structure with top party leaders and secondary leaders serving as committee chairs and 
members.  Further, the standing committees are the principal work groups for the 
legislature and appointments to committees are made by house speakers and senate 
presidents based on preferences of members and the leaders’ strategic calculations. 
Models of Incorporation 
The Simple Incorporation Model.  In order for female lawmakers to be influential 
over policy decisions, they must “be incorporated into the dominant political regime” 
(Preuhs 2006: 596 from Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984).  In the simple 
incorporation model, being part of the majority party is a necessary condition for female 
lawmakers’ influence over policy.  Support for this model was found in a study of city 
council and minority hiring practices when black council members were also members 
of the majority coalition (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984).  In this work, female 
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lawmakers who are part of the majority (party) coalition
7
 will be examined to determine 
if that is a condition for policy influence of female legislators. 
The Specific Institutional Incorporation Model.  The specific institutional 
incorporation model assumes females who hold formal positions of power, like serving 
as committee chairs, are more likely to influence specific policy issues.  This model goes 
beyond the simple incorporation model and asserts “institutional incorporation is another 
possible mechanism for influence, particularly in state and national legislative settings” 
(Preuhs 2006; Haynie 2001; Nelson 1991).  This model holds lawmakers who hold 
formal leadership positions, like the committee chairs who deal with specific policy 
issues, will exert additional policy influence.  Figure 2 shows the increase in the number 
of female committee chairs in the state legislatures from 1983-2002.  The legislative 
structure is different in a number of states but there are a number of commonalities like 
committee work and sponsorship of legislation being a legislator’s top priority (Francis 
1989) which lends itself to the study of this model.  In this study, an increase in the 
number of females who serve as committee chairs should be correlated with female 
group salient issues and the passage of legislation and/or increases in funding, etc. 
related to these issues.  One can see by the Figure there was a sharp increase in female 
committee chairs which should result in greater influence over public policy important to 
females. 
The Broad Institutional Incorporation Model.  Similar to the specific institutional 
incorporation model, the broad institutional incorporation model asserts females 
                                                 
7
 The term majority coalition as used by Preuhs is the same as majority party in the state legislature. 
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holding formal positions of power, like speaker of the house, senate president and/or 
lieutenant governor, or majority or minority leader, can exert power over a wide range of 
policy issues (Preuhs 2006).  Figure 3 reveals the increase in the number of females in 
leadership positions from 1983-2002.  These positions include speaker of the house, 
assistant speaker of the house, president pro tem of the house, president of the senate
8
, 
president pro tem of the senate, and the majority and minority leaders in both the house 
and the senate.  Preuhs reveals the evidence of these two incorporation models is mixed.  
Research has found a negative relationship between proportion of leadership positions 
held by black lawmakers and public expenditures in a variety of programs (Nelson 
1991).  However, some work has found a positive relationship between an index of 
incorporation, which is based on broad indicators of representation as well as 
institutional positions held by African Americans, and expenditures for black interest 
policies (Haynie 2001).  Since little research has been done in this area, it is an important 
factor to study.  In the case of this study, females in leadership positions began to 
steadily increase in the 1980s through the 2000s.  Given the influence the leadership in 
state legislatures has on legislation and its passage, one would believe an increase in 
females may lead to more attention to legislation important to females.  Therefore, we 
expect this increase in females in leadership roles in the state legislature will result in 
greater influence over public policy important to females. 
                                                 
8
 In Preuhs’ work, he did not use the lieutenant governor as one of the leadership positions in Senate 
because it is an elected statewide position rather than selected by the Senate membership.  However, in 
many states, the lieutenant governor has significant influence over committee member and chair 
appointments and referring legislation to committee.  As discussion of the inclusion of other leadership 
positions will be addressed in the conclusion. 
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The Party as Substantive Representative Model.  Many times liberal non-female 
party lawmakers will represent women’s interests.  Therefore, if the Democratic Party is 
in control of the legislature, women’s policy preferences may be advanced with or 
without female descriptive representation (Preuhs 2006).  This is an important 
mechanism to consider in this study dealing with the effects of descriptive 
representation.  While there has been an increase in the number of Republican female 
legislators, the majority of the females serving in the state legislatures have been 
members of the Democratic Party and that number has continued to increase.  At the 
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FIGURE 2 FEMALE STATE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE 
 CHAIRS, 1983-2002 
Note: Values represent the total number of females who served as committee chairs. 
N=1000 (50 states, 20 years).  Committee chairs were reported differently in 2002 
explaining the drop in the number of female chairs.  Source:  State Legislative  Leadership, 
Committees, and Staff. 
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same time, most of the push for female issues originated with the Democratic Party.  
Therefore, the influence on policy when the Democrats are the majority party may have 
less to do with the presence of female in the legislature more to do with the Democratic 
Party in power.   
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Figure 4 reveals the percentage of Democrat state legislatures during the years of 
this study.  While the percentage has decreased over the years, the mean has been above 
50 percent. In terms of this study, we expect to see female legislators’ influence on 
policy reduced when the Democratic party is the majority party.  A variable will be used  
in the models to act as a proxy for liberal governing coalition – Unified Democratic 
Government (Democratic Party control of both the governor and legislature).  As a 
result, the decrease in the percentage of seats held by Democrats results in an increase in 
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FIGURE 4 DEMOCRATIC PARTY CONTROL OF STATE 
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influence by female legislators over policy issues important to females.  In Preuhs' work, 
he did not account for political party of the legislators because in the case of blacks, the 
overwhelming majority is affiliated with the Democratic Party.  According to Figure 5, 
the majority of females in the state legislatures during the time of this study are also 
members of the Democrat Party.  At the same time, there is a steady increase in 
Republican female legislators.  With the exception of a few years (1985-1986 and 1995-
1996), the gap between female Democratic and Republican legislators has been 
consistent at approximately 20.5 percent.  In the last few years of this study, the gap 
increased to 22 percent.  Since this study is a replication of Preuhs' work, the political 
party affiliation of females will not be controlled for in the model. However, it could be 
an important discussion depending on the results of the model.  For example, if the 
number of females is increasing in number in the state legislatures and the majority of 
these females are members of the Democratic Party, would the Democrats be making 
changes and supporting policy to appeal to this increase in females?  Further, is the 
Democratic Party doing more to attract female voters and potential female candidates by 
addressing female group salient issues?  The implications of party affiliation will be 
addressed in the empirical chapters and in the conclusion. 
 
 
54 
 
 
HYPOTHESES 
These theories suggest there are a number of mechanisms and conditions through 
which female legislators influence public policy important to females.  The following 
hypotheses are derived from the theoretical models and provide the foundation for the 
empirical analysis of this study (adapted from Preuhs 2006).  Each hypothesis will be 
examined for each of the four policy areas.   
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H1 (The Presence Model):  Female descriptive representation is positively 
associated with female group influence in representative bodies. 
H2 (The Simple Incorporation Model):  When female representatives are 
members of the governing coalition,
9
 female descriptive representation is 
positively associated with female group influence in representative bodies. 
H3 (The Specific Institutional Incorporation Model):  When female 
representatives hold positions of power
10
 over specific policy areas, female 
descriptive representation is positively associated with female group influence in 
representative bodies.. 
H4 (The Broad Institutional Incorporation Model):  Female control of formal 
leadership positions
11
 is positively associated with policies favoring women’s 
interests.   
H5 (The Party as Substantive Representative Model):  When parties that share 
the policy goals of female representatives hold power, there is no relationship 
between levels of female representation or institutional power and policies 
benefitting females. 
As previously noted, research has found the true gender gap in public opinion 
exists on social welfare spending, social issues, and the use of force/violence issues and 
                                                 
9
 The governing coalition in this study refers to females members of the majority party in the legislature.   
10
 Positions of power in this study refer to females serving as committee chairs with jurisdiction over 
issues of education, child support, welfare expenditures, and child health insurance programs. 
11
 Formal leadership positions in this study include speaker of the house, assistant speaker of the house, 
president pro tem of the house, president of the senate, president pro tem of the senate and majority and 
minority leaders of the house and senate.  Legislators in these formal leadership positions have power over 
a wider range of policy issues through the use of agenda setting and logrolling (Preuhs 2006).  See 
Appendix for descriptive statistics. 
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these issues tend to be the strongest predictors of behavior for men and women 
(Kaufman and Petrocik 1999).  Based on these differences in public opinion, I have 
selected four different policy measures to assess the effect of female descriptive 
representation in the state legislatures on female group salient issues: per pupil 
education expenditures in constant dollars, percentage of children without health 
insurance, welfare benefits, and percentage of child support collected. 
There is growing literature revealing gender differences in fiscal policies in 
America.  While men and women find education an important issue, they will differ in 
whether they would support education spending over tax cuts.  Men would give first 
priority to tax cuts while women would support an increase in education spending 
(Alvarez and McCaffery 2000), which relates back to the attitude and salience models 
proposed by Kaufman and Petrocik (1999).  When asked about their attitude toward 
education and spending, men would be supportive but when asked about the importance 
(salience) of this issue over other fiscal policy (tax cuts), men would not typically 
support educational policy issues while women would prioritize that issue.   
Females tend to advocate for social programs designed to help the 
underprivileged and will support a more activist government in these areas (Carroll 
1988), and they are more sensitive than men to the consequences social policies have for 
individuals (Carroll 1988; Gidengil 1995).  Women believe the government has a 
responsibility to “provides services, ensure jobs and living standards, and health care 
(Shapiro and Mahajan 1986, Gilens 1988, Chaney, Alvarez and Nagler 1998).  
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Therefore, the issues of welfare benefits and rate of children’s health insurance coverage 
will be examined in this work. 
Additionally, males are in dispute with females about the issue of “big 
government” (Carroll 1988; Kaufman and Petrocik 1999) and they are more driven by 
“pocketbook” concerns (Chaney, Alvarez and Nagler 1998; Welch and Hibbing 1992).  
Females are more compassionate about and more concerned for the underprivileged than 
males (Carroll 1988; Gilligan 1982a, 1982b) so we expect to see females in the state 
legislature supporting these issues.   
Finally, women are more active on the issue of child support because it benefits 
women as a class and because most individuals seeking support are female and women’s 
interest groups are more active on child support issues (Keiser and Meier 1996).
12
  
Keiser and Meier (1996) examined the issue of child support with bureaucrats and found 
passive representation (descriptive representation) leads to active representation, having 
discretion to advocate the interests of the constituents served.  Keiser finds gender is a 
salient issue for bureaucrats when the policy benefits women as a class.   
Since females are more concerned for the disadvantaged in society and for 
children, are more compassionate than men on many of these issues, we expect a 
positive relationship between female descriptive representation and public policy on 
these issues.    
 
 
                                                 
12
 League of Women Voters and American Association of University Women, as examples (see Crowley 
2003). 
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DATA AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 The data for this study is based on a pooled time series cross sectional data set, 
covering 50 states over a twenty year period from 1983-2002 for a total of 1000 cases. In 
most of the analysis, the total number of cases will vary.  For example, AK, HI and NE 
are excluded because of lack of data for all variables and in the case of NE, the one 
house legislative body prevents an accurate analysis compared to states with a two house 
legislative body.  There were also some dependent variables selected and data were not 
available for all years.  Those variables will be discussed in the next section. 
   A number of sources were used to collect data for this study.  First, the United 
States Census Data were used for a number of variables in the dataset.  Second, Preuhs’ 
data on welfare spending in the 1980s, and child support payment data in the 1980s and 
1990s from Kaiser’s work, were used in this work.  Third, the State Politics and Policy 
Quarterly State Data set is utilized for a number of independent and dependent variables.  
Fourth, The Center for American Women in Politics (CAWP) at Rutgers University was 
used to gather data on the number of females in the legislature and females in leadership 
positions. Fifth, The State Legislative Leadership Committees and Staff handbooks are 
utilized to collect data for female committee chairs and leadership positions held by 
females in the state legislatures from 1983-2002.  Finally, the U.S. Bureau of the Census 
data were utilized. 
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 Dependent Variables
13
  
The dependent variables for this study include per pupil education expenditures 
in constant dollars, percentage of children without health insurance, welfare benefits, 
and percentage of child support collected. 
Per pupil education expenditures in constant dollars is the amount spent on 
education per student by year.  The expectation is female representation and 
incorporation increases in state legislators, will influence the increase in educational 
expenditures.  The State Politics and Policy state dataset reported these expenditures 
utilizing U.S. Census data. 
The variable percentage of children without health insurance is measured by the 
percentage of uninsured children in a state by year, which is expected to decrease with 
focused attention on this policy area by female legislators and leadership.  The U.S. 
Bureau of the Census did not begin reporting child health insurance coverage rates until 
1987 which is the start date for data analysis.     
Welfare benefits is measured by the average monthly Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) cash benefit levels by year.  In the mid-1990s, AFDC 
changed to Temporary Aid to Need Families (TANF) which will be explained in more 
detail in Chapter VII.  As females increase their presence and leadership role in state 
legislators, welfare benefits will increase.  Data from Preuhs’ work were used and 
additional data was collected from the U.S. Census Bureau.  
                                                 
13
 See Appendix for descriptive statistics and explanation of coding. 
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Finally, the variable percentage of child support collected is measured by the 
percentage of voluntary child support payments collected by year.  The underlying 
assumption in this work is female lawmakers will seek higher levels of funding, benefits, 
and/or more attention to these public policy issues than male lawmakers.  Lael Keiser 
has done extensive research in child support and her dataset for the years 1983-1991 was 
utilized for this study.  Additional data was not collected after 1991 because the U.S. 
Census Bureau’s collection of these state data changed and consistent numbers were 
unavailable. 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables for this study include percent female legislators, 
percent female committee chair, female institutional incorporation, and unified 
Democratic government (of executive and legislative branches).  Control variables 
include percent Democratic legislators, citizen liberalism, political competition index, 
income, poverty, and female labor force participation
14
. 
The percent female legislators variable is measured by the percentage of female 
legislators in a state by year. The variable female committee chair was measured by 
females serving as committee chairs for those committees having jurisdiction over the 
policy issues of education, child support, welfare expenditures, and child health 
insurance programs. The female institutional incorporation variable was measured by 
the number of females holding formal leadership positions in the state house and senate 
including speaker of the house, assistant speaker of the house, president pro tem of the 
                                                 
14
 See Appendix for descriptive statistics of all variables. 
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house, president of the senate, president pro tem of the senate and majority and minority 
leaders of the house and senate.   
The variables percent female committee chair and female institutional 
incorporation are coded based on data from the State Legislative Leadership, 
Committees, and Staff handbook which provided some challenges.  There are similarities 
with the committee systems in each state and their overall function, but there is variation 
in the jurisdiction of committees per state.  In order to code female committee chair, two 
of the dependent variables did not have a perfect “fit” for coding.  For per pupil 
education expenditures in constant dollars and percentage of children without health 
insurance, the committees were education and health and committees with specific 
jurisdiction over these areas existed in each state.  For welfare benefits and percentage of 
child support collected, it was determined that a social services committee in most states 
would have jurisdiction over these policy issues.  For a number of states, a judgment call 
had to be made because there was more than one committee dealing with social services.  
For example, a state may have a human services committee and a child, youth and 
family committee.  Obviously, either of those committee could have jurisdiction over 
these policy areas.  Without having data from each state and verifying each year and the 
committee’s jurisdiction, there will not always be consistency.  Therefore, to be 
consistent, coding of female committee chairs was done based on how the data were 
reported by the states.  While the coding was consistent when the states had a number of 
committees listed with possible jurisdictions, it does provide challenges to the analysis.  
This will be addressed in the last chapter. 
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Similar challenges in coding occurred with female institutional incorporation.  
Most states have a similar leadership structure but the powers awarded to these leaders 
may vary by state.  The handbook reports the leadership positions but without knowing 
the power structure designated in each state with these roles, there is no way of knowing 
what type of influence leaders would have.  These challenges and results will be 
discussed in the last chapter.   
For the remaining variables unified Democratic government, percent Democratic 
legislators, citizen liberalism, political competition index, income, poverty, and female 
labor force participation, various datasets previously listed were utilized to collect these 
data. Unified Democratic government is a dichotomous variable and is coded one if the 
Democratic Party controls both the legislative and executive branches in a state.  It is 
used to interact with female legislators, female committee chair, and female institutional 
incorporation in other to test the models in this study.  The variable percent Democratic 
legislators and citizen liberalism was used to control for the larger margins of 
Democratic party members and liberal ideological orientations because Democratic and 
liberal states are usually more generous with social welfare spending and social 
programs in general compared to the Republican party and conservative states.  A 
political competition index variable is used with the range of one party control to 
legislative seats being evenly split between the parties to determine the range of 
influence based on unified or divided control of the state legislature.  Income, poverty, 
and female labor force participation are used as controls because of the direct influence 
on finance and budgeting in the states. 
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MODELS 
 An OLS model with a lagged dependent variable and panel correlated standard 
errors is used to estimate the coefficients for this study.  The model used to estimate the 
effects of female descriptive representation is presented below for state i and year t.  The 
model will be run for all four dependent variables.  Additionally, variables are interacted 
in order to estimate specific effects.  Control variables include dummy variables for 46 
states and nineteen years and the lagged dependent variables listed below. 
Per Pupil Education Expendituresit+1 = b1(female legislatorsit)+b2(female 
legislatorsit*unified democratit)+ b3 (female education committee chairit)+b4 (female 
education committee chairit*unified democratit)+ +b5(female institutional 
incorporationit)+ b6 (female institutional incorporationit*unified democratit)+b7(female 
laborit)+ b8(democrat legislatureit)+b9(citizen liberalismit)+b10(political competitionit)+ 
b11(incomeit)+b12(povertyit)  
Child Health Insuranceit+1 = b1(female legislatorsit)+b2(female legislatorsit*unified 
democratit)+ b3 (female health committee chairit)+b4 (female health committee 
chairit*unified democratit)+ +b5(female institutional incorporationit)+ b6 (female 
institutional incorporationit*unified democratit)+b7(female laborit)+ b8(democrat 
legislatureit)+b9(citizen liberalismit)+b10(political competitionit)+ 
b11(incomeit)+b12(povertyit) 
Welfare Benefitsit+1 = b1(female legislatorsit)+b2(female legislatorsit*unified 
democratit)+ b3 (female social services [welfare] committee chairit)+b4 (female social 
services [welfare] committee chairit*unified democratit)+ +b5(female institutional 
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incorporationit)+ b6 (female institutional incorporationit*unified democratit)+b7(female 
laborit)+ b8(democrat legislatureit)+b9(citizen liberalismit)+b10(political competitionit)+ 
b11(incomeit)+b12(povertyit) 
Child Support Collectionit+1 = b1(female legislatorsit)+b2(female legislatorsit*unified 
democratit)+ b3 (female social services [child support] committee chairit)+b4 (female 
social services [child support] committee chairit*unified democratit)+ +b5(female 
institutional incorporationit)+ b6 (female institutional incorporationit*unified 
democratit)+b7(female laborit)+ b8(democrat legislatureit)+b9(citizen 
liberalismit)+b10(political competitionit)+ b11(incomeit)+b12(povertyit) 
The expectations from each model are as follows.  According to the presence 
model (H1), the coefficient for female legislators will be positive supporting female 
descriptive representation leading to greater influence on female group salient issues.  
The simple incorporation model (H2) predicts female representation would only 
influence policy in a liberal governing coalition.  Since this is a conditional hypothesis, 
interaction terms are included in the model (see Brambor, et al. 2006).  When unified 
Democratic government is interacted with female legislator, the coefficient will be 
positive (while the coefficient for the baseline effect, b1 is zero).  This reveals the 
influence of female legislators is conditional upon the presence of a unified democratic 
control.  The specific institutional incorporation model (H3) predicts a positive 
coefficient for female committee chair.  With more female institutional power in the 
legislature, the coefficient for female institutional incorporation will lead to greater 
influence on female group salient issues, according to the broad institutional 
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incorporation model (H4).  When the variables female legislators, female committee 
chair and female institutional incorporation are interacted with unified democrat 
government, the party as a substantive model predicts a negative coefficient as 
representation and incorporation exert no additional influence under unified Democratic 
government (H5).   This is also a conditional hypothesis, so the interaction terms are 
included. 
Including the interaction terms in this model may increase multicollinearity 
making it less likely that the coefficient on the interaction term will be significant.  
Typically, the issue arises when the models are run with the interaction terms and the 
coefficients change, which is taken as a sign of multicollinearity.  However, these 
coefficients are expected to change with the inclusion of the interaction terms and should 
not always be taken as a sign of multicollinearity.  Even with high multicollinearity 
resulting in large standard errors, this does not mean that the results are wrong.  With the 
interaction terms, the interest is in the effect of X on Y when condition Z is present.  It is 
possible that even if the coefficients are insignificant in the model, the marginal effects 
may be significant, so the effects associated with multicollinearity are often 
“exaggerated” (Brambor et al 2006: 70).  In the case of this study, preliminary models 
will be run including only relevant variables and those results will be compared to the 
full model.  Also, predicted values will be calculated to determine the effect of X on Y 
when condition Z is present using the formula Y=β0+β1X+β2Z+β3XZ
15
. 
                                                 
15
 In this study, X is female legislators, female committee chair (different for each dependent variable), 
and female institutional incorporation, and the condition Z is divided or unified Republican government 
(0) or unified Democratic government (1).  
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There are differences among the dependent variables selected for this work.  
Kaufman and Petrocik (1999) find social welfare spending and social issues, and the 
salience of these issues, are found to be one of the strongest predictors of behavior for 
females and males, with females favoring social welfare spending more than males.  
Therefore, female’s presence in the legislature may have a stronger influence on the 
issues of welfare benefits, percentage of children without health insurance, and 
percentage of child support collected.  
CONCLUSION 
This study will contribute to the literature on female descriptive representation by 
a closer examination of legislative bodies and how female descriptive representation 
influences specific policy issues, or substantive representation.  Rather than simply 
studying the increase in females in the legislature, this study turns to state level data and 
will examine the complexity of the lawmaking body and the mechanisms to determine 
influence, thus revealing the influence of female lawmakers is conditional.  This 
influence may be with the presence of females in the legislature, females incorporated 
into the institutional system (i.e. serving as committee chairs, minority or majority party 
leaders or institutional leaders), or the conditioning effects of a majority governing 
coalition.   Previous work does not account for all of these effects until Preuhs’ 2006 
work using race.  This study will reveal the same conclusions about the effects of female 
descriptive representation on policy.  In a larger context, this work will show the 
importance of a continued increase in females serving in lawmaking bodies and the 
longevity of their terms giving female legislators opportunities to serve in these 
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leadership roles thus increasing their policy influence.  While the number of female 
legislators has flat lined, we have seen an increase in the number of women serving in 
committee chair positions as well as leadership positions like speaker of the house and 
Senate president and/or lieutenant governor.  This work will also show these leadership 
positions are a necessary condition for increase policy influence, however, this is 
conditioned upon the political environment.  Therefore, more females in public office 
are good, but the longer they are in these positions, the stronger their voice on female 
group salient issues. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PER PUPIL EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES IN THE STATES, 
1983-2002 
 
Female legislators always express concerns and commitments to representing 
women and their concerns.  Research has shown females more strongly support 
government spending programs (Gilligan 1982a, 1982b; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986), 
and they will support a more activist government in these areas.  Further, female 
legislators tend to focus their legislative attention on issues such as education (Dodson 
and Carroll 1991; Carroll 1994; Thomas 1991; Thomas 1994; Thomas and Welch 1991; 
Tamerius 1995; Flammang 1997; Carroll 2000; Carroll 2001; Carroll 2003).  It is not the 
argument in this research that males don’t care about education and education funding 
but females prioritize this issue as more important. We also learn females have said they 
will use their positions of power as party leaders or committee chairs to get their policy 
priorities on the party agenda or to achieve their policy goals.  This chapter reviews the 
history of education funding in the United States, defines the model and hypotheses 
tested on the variable per pupil educational expenditures, and examines and discusses 
the results.   
HISTORY OF EDUCATION FUNDING 
The founding fathers understood the connection between a well-educated 
citizenry and a prosperous and developing country.  However, they left responsibility of 
this initiative out of the Constitution.  Historically, the national government, while 
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understanding its overall role in promoting the importance of education, has left the 
governance to state and local authorities.  The support from the federal government has 
been a targeted approach.  Additional funding has been provided for workforce 
education, support for math and science programs, and additional support through block 
grants for disadvantaged children.  The role in the 1960s and 1970s changed as the state 
government began to rely on the federal government for these grants of money providing 
the federal government more influence in decision making. However, in the 1980s, the 
federal government’s role began to decline again, reinforcing the state’s primary role in 
providing education to its citizens.  The federal government still maintained a role in 
providing for handicapped and disadvantaged children but the other responsibility rested 
with the states (Elmore and Fuhrman 1990).   
Education funding is always a topic of debate in local school boards, state 
legislatures, and in Congress.  Historically, the public education systems in the states 
have been financed mainly through a property tax based system resulting in wealthier 
districts providing more in per pupil educational expenditures than poorer school 
districts.  This resulted in increased litigation in the states challenging this property-
based education finance system.  Court rulings in numerous states have concluded that 
this system is unconstitutional and ordered the state to develop different ways to provide 
equitable financing.  Many states face the challenge of moving from local government 
control of education to state control in order to address the inequalities. 
 In 1971, the Serrano case in California became famous dealing with education 
funding and policy regarding inequalities.  The California public education system was 
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under attack for its financing structure dependent largely on a school district’s tax base 
resulting in inequalities in per pupil educational expenditures.  For example, in 1968-
1969, the Baldwin Park School District spent $577.49 in per pupil educational 
expenditures while the Beverly Hills spent $1239.72.  The court ruling struck down this 
system and said the system California had in place to offset the inequalities was 
inadequate.  According to the Supreme Court, “affluent districts have their cake and eat 
it too; they can provide a high quality education for their children while paying lower 
taxes.  Poor districts, by contrast, have no cake at all” (National Center for Education 
Statistics, NCES hereafter, www.nces.ed.gov).   
 Starting with this case in California, court rulings in almost every state have 
questioned the constitutionality of an education funding system that is so reliant on local 
property wealth.  In about 1/3 of the states, the supreme courts have ruled this system 
unconstitutional based on their interpretation of the equal protection clause of the U.S. 
Constitution as well as education articles in state constitutions.  In more recent cases, 
rulings cited the unique needs of the students in poorer districts and the lack of resources 
in these areas.  States were forced to reevaluate their financing system and enact changes 
to address the inequalities resulting in states redirecting funding to poorer districts (Card 
and Payne 2002; Dee 2004; Murray, Evans, and Schwab 1998).  In many cases, the court 
ruling set deadlines for changes to the system.  Reviewing district level data from 1972-
1992 concluded that the earliest state reforms of education financing resulted in an 
increase in spending by 11 percent in the poorest state districts while the funding in 
wealthy districts remained the same (Murray, Evans, and Schwab 1998).  However, in 
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later cases, rulings indicated that states had not done an adequate job addressing the 
problem so the reforms continued. 
 In early 1990, governors in the fifty states convened to endorse a set of national 
goals for education and then President George Bush endorsed these goals in his State of 
the Union address .   This was an historic time in the debate over the national 
government’s role in education with the support from the governors. When Clinton came 
into office, his strategy was systematic reforms.  “The goals are to set high expectations 
for all American schools; to include students at risk, now typically served by isolated 
programs that focus on remediation, in more ambitious instruction aimed at the 
standards; and to coordinate all federal programs to serve common purposes” (Furhman 
1994: 84).  The Clinton Administration had a number of initiatives with goals and 
expectations for improving education and providing grants of money to states for these 
reforms. In order to receive much needed funding, the states had to comply (Fuhrman 
1994).   
The most recent 2002 No Child Left Behind Act also linked performance in 
public schools to federal government funding for education.  If students did not perform, 
schools would not qualify for government grants and the government could take control 
of the school and shut it down.  This legislation, along with the educational reform in the 
1990s has led to a larger role in education by the federal government, a change from the 
1980s. 
According to the NCES 2011 report, per pupil expenditures rose during the 
1980s, remained stable during the first part of the 1990s, and rose again after 1992–93. 
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From 1980–1991, there was an increase of 37 percent.  From 1990–91 to 1994–95, the 
change was less than 1 percent, with an increase of 32 percent from 1994–95 to 2007–
08. In 2007–08, per pupil educational expenditures in the states were approximately 
$10,297 (NCES).  As a result of the state level litigation and reform, increasing pressure 
from the national level, and increases in spending, selecting this variable for this 
research study is timely to determine female legislators’ influence. 
 Figure 6 represents the mean per pupil educational expenditures during the years 
of this study, 1983-2002.  The Figure reveals a steady increase in the amount of 
expenditures in education for almost all years.  This increase parallels the increase in the 
number of female legislators, increase in female committee chairs, and increase in the 
number of leadership positions held by females in the state legislatures.  Given these 
trends, we would expect there is some influence of female descriptive representation and 
increases in spending on education.   
MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
The following model, as presented and explained in Chapter III, was used to 
estimate the coefficients for per pupil education expenditures: 
Per Pupil Education Expendituresit+1 = b1(female legislatorsit)+b2(female 
legislatorsit*unified democratit)+ b3 (female education committee chairit)+b4 
(female education committee chairit*unified democratit)+ +b5(female institutional 
incorporationit)+ b6 (female institutional incorporationit*unified 
democratit)+b7(female laborit)+ b8(democrat legislatureit)+b9(citizen 
liberalismit)+b10(political competitionit)+b11(incomeit) +b12(povertyit) 
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Also explained in Chapter III were the hypotheses for this study.  Hypothesis 1 
(H1) states female descriptive representation is positively associated with female group 
influence in representative bodies.  Since females prioritize issues such as education, an 
increase in the number of females in legislative bodies will result in more attention to 
this issue, thus, an increase in per pupil education expenditures in the states.  According 
to hypothesis 2 (H2), when female representatives are members of the governing 
coalition, female descriptive representation is positively associated with female group 
influence in representative bodies.  When unified Democratic government is interacted 
with female legislator, the coefficient will be positive, revealing influence of female 
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Note:  Graph represents mean per pupil educational expenditures in dollars by year.  
N=1000 (50 states, 20 years).  Source: State Politics and policy Quarterly State data 
set. 
74 
 
legislators on an increase in per pupil educational expenditures is conditional upon the 
presence of a unified democratic control of the state government. In the case of this 
model and hypothesis, predicted values will be calculated to determine the influence of 
female legislators in a liberal governing coalition. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3) states when female representatives hold positions of power 
over specific policy areas, female descriptive representation is positively associated with 
female group influence in representative bodies.  In the case of education spending, if a 
female is chair of the education committee in the state, the result will be an increase in 
per pupil educational expenditures.  Table 1 shows the increases in the number of 
females who serve as education committee chairs.  The number of female education 
committee chairs increased during the late 1980s and held relatively stable until the mid-
1990s.  During the late 1990s, the number of females who served as chair increased 
significantly, about 63 percent from 1997 to 2002.   
According to hypothesis 4 (H4), female control of formal leadership positions is 
positively associated with policies favoring women’s interests.  With more female 
institutional power in the legislature (an increase in the number of leadership positions 
held by females), the coefficient for female institutional incorporation will be positive, 
revealing the influence on increases in per pupil educational expenditures.   
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TABLE 1 FEMALE EDUCATION COMMITTEE CHAIRS, 1983-2002 
Year Number of States Year Number of States 
1983 18 1993 22 
1984 18 1994 22 
1985 11 1995 22 
1986 11 1996 19 
1987 11 1997 19 
1988 11 1998 22 
1989 21 1999 24 
1990 21 2000 28 
1991 19 2001 26 
1992 19 2002 31 
Note: Cells represent the total number of states with a female education committee chair in 
either the House or Senate by year.  N=1000 (50 states, 20 years). Source: State 
Legislative Leadership, Committees, and Staff. 
 
Finally, hypothesis 5 (H5) states when parties share the policy goals of female 
representatives hold power, there is no relationship between levels of female 
representation or institutional power and policies benefiting females. In order to test 
this hypothesis, interaction terms were created.  When the variables of female 
legislators, female committee chair and female institutional incorporation are interacted 
with unified democrat government, the party as a substantive model predicts an increase 
in representation or incorporation provides no additional effects in a liberal governing 
coalition.   The coefficient for these interactions is expected to be negative because the 
political party shares these same policy preferences thus negating the influence of female 
legislators.  In order to understand the results of the interaction terms and the conditional 
effects of a liberal governing coalition, predicted values will be calculated to explain the 
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influence of female legislators, committee chairs, and female leadership on educational 
expenditures. 
RESULTS 
 Table 2 presents the results of the preliminary models run on the data.  
Interaction terms are included in the model in order to test the conditional effects of 
political party.  As explained in Chapter III, the introduction of the interaction terms 
does introduce some collinearity but allows for the proper specification of the theoretical 
expectations.  Further, the predicted value of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable with the conditional effects of the model helps explain the interaction terms.  
We expect to find when females are in a state which is dominated by a liberal governing 
coalition and in which the Democratic party holds the most seats, female legislators will 
not have the influence over policymaking compared to cases where there is no liberal 
governing coalition.  Each theoretical model was run with only variables related to that 
model and the results are presented in the Table.  The Simple Incorporation Model is 
represented by the interaction between female legislators and unified democratic 
government (from the model, female legislatorsit*unified democratit).  The results from 
the model labeled “party” are the results presented in the Table below which is the full 
model to show how the influence of female legislators is reduced in Democratic 
controlled governments. 
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TABLE 2   PRELIMINARY MODELS OF THE ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF  
  FEMALE REPRESENTATION AND INCORPORATION ON  
  PER PUPIL EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES, 1983-2002 
 
Independent Variable Presence Specific Broad All Party 
Female Legislators (%) -19.18*     -20.20* -21.19* 
  (5.18)     (6.09) (7.83) 
Fem Leg*UniDemGov         2.20 
          (11.19) 
Female Education Chair   -114.02   -92.08 -177.18* 
    (76.05)   (70.02) (90.27) 
Fem Ed Chair*UniDemGov         357.92* 
          (166.23) 
Female Inst Incorporation 
  
-6.15 2.43 4.30 
      (4.29) (4.43) (5.43) 
Fem Inst Inc*UniDemGov         -10.04 
          (8.55) 
Unified Dem Gov -235.24* -236.26* -232.82* -237.09* -261.46 
  (82.81) (85.85) (84.96) (83.58) (153.78) 
Democratic Legislators (%) 1.65 3.70 2.82 1.89 2.04 
  (2.64) (2.70) (2.81) (2.69) (2.67) 
Citizen Liberalism 15.81* 13.93* 14.43* 15.72* 16.39* 
  (3.08) (3.19) (3.15) (3.07) (3.42) 
Political Competition 31.77* 31.39* 30.96* 32.05* 31.60* 
  (2.42) (2.48) (2.46) (2.49) (2.62) 
Income .18* .18* .18* .18* .18* 
  (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) 
Poverty -79.72* -79.05* -78.91* -80.25* -79.39* 
 
(11.73) (11.77) (11.78) (11.86) (12.07) 
Fem Labor Force Part .21 -6.18 -5.75 1.18 3.98 
  (11.34) (12.28) (11.86) (11.28) (11.28) 
Per Pupil Edu Expend .10* .10* .10* .10* .10* 
  (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Constant 1145.54 1335.77 1358.99 1096.44 941.24 
 
(769.00) (819.26) (809.76) (774.13) (773.92) 
Wald χ2 4021.05* 3883.34* 3786.90* 4134.66* 3965.69* 
R
2
 .66 .66 .66 .66 .66 
Note: *p<.05 in a one tailed t-test.  Dependent Variable:  Per Pupil Education Expenditures (t+1).  Cells 
contain OLS coefficients with Panel-Correlated Standard Errors in parentheses.  N=940 for all models (47 
states, 20 years).  AK, HI, and NE are excluded.   
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Table 3 reports the results of the full model.  While the coefficients are 
significant for coefficients representing the Presence Model (H1) and Specific 
Institutional Incorporation Model (H3) based on a one tailed t-test with significance 
level of .05, they are in the wrong direction.  According to the hypotheses, an increase in 
the number of female state legislators and a female serving as education committee chair 
should result in an increase in per pupil educational expenditures.  In the case of these 
results, female representation and incorporation would lead to a decrease in education 
funding.  The Broad Institutional Incorporation Model (H4) is not supported by these 
results as the coefficient for female institutional incorporation is not significant.  An 
increase in the number of females in leadership positions, like speaker of the house or 
majority leader, had no additional influence on per pupil educational expenditures.  With 
these results, examination could be done in future research to determine if the 
Democratic Party in states with high levels of citizen liberalism and/or in highly 
competitive states would actively seek to nominate women, especially liberal women, to 
public office.    
In order to understand the interaction terms and their significance, predicted 
values must be calculated.  The results are presented in Table 4.  The Simple 
Incorporation Model (H2) is not supported by these results. When female legislators is 
interacted with unified democratic government, we expect the predicted value to be 
positive meaning the influence of female legislators is conditioned by the presence of a 
liberal governing coalition (unified Democratic control of the state government).  The 
values are negative, not significant, and it appears the party is diminishing the effect of 
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female legislators. Figure 7 provides a graphical illustration of the effects of female 
legislators on per pupil educational expenditures by party control of the government.  
The graph reveals that as the percentage of females increase in the state legislature, the 
effect is a decrease in expenditures but those results are only significant when the 
government is divided or controlled by the Republican Party. The Party as a Substantive 
Representative Model (H5) is also not supported by these results.  While the predicted 
value is negative, it is not significant for unified Democratic government.  Increasing 
female representation and incorporation in a liberal governing coalition (a state 
government controlled by the Democratic Party) will exert no additional influence on 
policy issues.  Figures 7, 8, and 9 provide graphical illustrations for female legislators, 
female education committee chair, and female institutional incorporation and the effect 
on per pupil educational expenditures by party control.  The graphs reveal the negative 
effect of female descriptive representation and incorporation on education spending in a 
liberal governing coalition compared to divided control or Republican control. An 
interesting finding from the results is the effects of divided control of government or 
unified control by the Republican Party.  The predicted value is significant and negative.  
While the hypothesis predicts negative values, in this case, the significant results are 
with divided government or a non-liberal governing coalition.  In the case of per pupil 
educational spending, the predicted value is both negative and significant for female 
legislators and female education committee chair in a divided or unified Republican 
government.  These results are not as expected according to the model and have 
implications for future research, especially the influence of the Republican Party.    
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TABLE 3 THE EFFECT OF FEMALE REPRESENTATION AND  
  INCORPORATION ON PER PUPIL EDUCATIONAL    
  EXPENDITURES, 1983-2002 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient 
Female Legislators (%) -21.19* 
 
(7.83) 
Female Legislators*Unified Dem Government 2.20 
  (11.19) 
Female Education Committee Chair -177.18* 
 
(90.27) 
Female Education Committee Chair*Unified Dem Government 357.92* 
  (166.23) 
Female Institutional Incorporation 4.30 
 
(5.43) 
Female Institutional Incorporation*Unified Dem Government -10.04 
  (8.55) 
Unified Democratic Government -261.46 
 
(153.78) 
Democratic Legislators (%) 2.04 
  (2.67) 
Citizen Liberalism 16.39* 
 
(3.42) 
Political Competition 31.60* 
  (2.62) 
Income .18* 
 
(.02) 
Poverty -79.39* 
  (12.07) 
Female Labor Force Participation 3.98 
 
(11.28) 
Per Pupil Education Expenditures .10* 
  (.03) 
Constant 941.24 
 
(773.92) 
Wald χ2 3965.69* 
R
2
 .66 
Note: *p<.05 in a one tailed t-test.  Dependent Variable:  Per Pupil Education Expenditures (t+1).  Cells 
contain OLS coefficients with Panel-Correlated Standard Errors in parentheses.  N=940 for all models 
(47 states, 20 years).  AK, HI, and NE are excluded.   
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TABLE 4  PREDICTED VALUES OF FEMALE LEGISLATORS, FEMALE  
 EDUCATION COMMITTEE CHAIR, AND FEMALE  
INSTITUTIONAL INCORPORATION ON PER PUPIL 
EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES BY PARTY CONTROL OF 
GOVERNMENT, 1983-2002 
 
Variable 
Predicted 
Value 
Standard 
Error 
T-
Statistic 
Female Legislators (%)       
 
Divided or Unified Republican Government -21.19* 7.91 -2.68 
  Unified Democratic Government -280.45 205.28 -1.37 
Female Education Committee Chair 
   
 
Divided or Unified Republican Government -177.18* 87.92 -2.02 
 
Unified Democratic Government -80.72 265.44 -0.30 
Female Institutional Incorporation       
 
Divided or Unified Republican Government 4.30 5.69 0.76 
  Unified Democratic Government -267.2 212.25 -1.26 
Note: Cells Represent constant dollar amounts.  Predicted values for female legislator, female 
committee chair, and female institutional incorporation were calculated using the following 
formula: Y=β0+β1X+β2Z+β3XZ. This illustrates the effect of a one-unit change in X on Y when 
condition Z is present and Z=0 when divided or unified Republican government is present and Z=0 
when unified Democratic government is present (see Brambor et al. 2006).  
 
The other significant variables in the model include: citizen liberalism, political 
competition, income, and poverty.  The significance of citizen liberalism indicates that 
the higher the state’s rating of liberalism, the more money will be spent on education 
funding.  Income and poverty coefficients are both significant and as indicated, as 
income increases, education spending increases while an increase in poverty results in a 
decrease in spending on education.  Historical analysis of education spending reveals the 
reliance on local property taxes to fund a significant portion of per pupil education 
expenses so the significance of these variables makes sense.  Finally, according to V.O. 
Key’s model, party competition leads to the passage of policies more generous than 
would be pursued without party competition (1949).  Therefore, when political 
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competition is significant, the more “competitive” the state, meaning the closer the 
number of seats between the Democratic and Republican parties, the more positive the 
influence on education funding.  
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 While the results for models with the variable per pupil educational expenditures 
did not provide any significant results, it does provide for an interesting discussion.  
While women typically advocate for female group salient issues and women prioritize 
issues concerning education, based on these results, female descriptive representation 
and incorporation does not lead to any additional influence on per pupil educational 
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expenditures.  In the case of conditional effects, the Democratic Party does not provide 
more influence in the area of education spending than female descriptive representation.  
At the same time, the Republican Party appears to have some effect on educational 
expenditures.  None of the models predicted these results but it opens the door for future 
research in this area.  As revealed in Figure 5 (Chapter III), there has been a steady 
increase in Republican female legislators.  This increase may be having an influence on 
female group salient issues that the five models tested in this study did not consider.  
Future studies may want to consider additional control variables or test a different model 
to determine what influence the Republican Party has in the state legislature.  It may also 
be interesting to study regional influences of the Republican Party to determine if the 
Party in states varies in characteristics and policy goals resulting in different levels of 
influence by female legislators.   
As history reveals, education spending and initiatives gained much attention over 
the past several decades at the local, state, and national level.  In most states, education 
is one of the largest state expenditures.  Therefore, whether or not there are more females 
in the legislature or females in leadership positions, education is not ignored.  There is 
always pressure from the local school districts for additional funding to help educate 
their students.  This pressure is heightened by state legislatures and national education 
initiatives to provide equitable educational opportunities, decrease dropout rates, 
increase graduation rates, and increase test scores.  Further, the pressure from court 
rulings in the past few decades has added to the states’ responsibility to address the 
inequalities in funding and constitutionality in their educational systems.  The 
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individuals in the government positions may not be as influential in exerting influence 
over funding as are external factors forced on states.   
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For example, the state of Texas has been focused on inequalities in education 
spending for decades.  During the time of this study, the Texas Supreme Court agreed 
and ruled in the 1989 Edgewood v Kirby case the financing system of public education in 
Texas to be unconstitutional.  This came after about twenty years of the legislature trying 
a number of different measures to ensure equality in education expenditures while also 
protecting the rights of local ISDs.  Funding is still an issue in the state of Texas:  the 
wealthy districts want to keep their tax dollars to provide for their students and the 
poorer districts believe funding equality is not adequate because the needs of their 
students in these poorer districts are usually greater (Tannahill 2005).  Most states have 
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struggled with the same issues as Texas in the past fifty years.  On the national scene, the 
government is increasing pressure for systematic reforms of education through the 
reform efforts during the Clinton administration.  When money is at stake, governing 
bodies take action.  The pressure game is on and whether males or females in the state 
legislatures, serving as education committee chair, or in leadership positions, education 
and per pupil expenditures  is always a topic of discussion and debate and would not be 
ignored as a result of fewer females.   
Another interesting way to evaluate the influence of females in governing bodies 
on issues of education may be to examine the role of the state education governing 
boards that are carrying out the initiatives.  Females may be advocating for more for 
local school districts to have control.  Examining how the states use educational funds, 
possibly in support of female issues in education, may also provide interesting results.  
Also, one could look at bill sponsorship by female lawmakers to determine if they are 
pushing issues dealing with education funding.  While this study looked at the chair of 
the education committee to determine female influence, it may be that the finance chair 
or appropriations chair in a state has more influence over education funding than the 
education committee chair.  Examining local school boards and the influence of females 
may also provide a more interesting approach to studying female descriptive 
representation influence. 
 The last chapter provides a discussion of these issues, the overall findings, and 
future research in this area. 
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CHAPTER V 
CHILD HEALTH – THE UNINSURED IN THE STATES, 
1987-2002 
 
Health care and the welfare of family and children is always a top priority for 
females (Dodson and Carroll 1991; Carroll 1994; Thomas 1991; Thomas 1994; Thomas 
and Welch 1991; Tamerius 1995; Flammang 1997; Carroll 2000; Carroll 2001; Carroll 
2003) and typically, women are more supportive of government programs, action, and 
intervention (Schlesinger and Heldman 2000).   Due to females’ traditional role as the 
primary caregiver, female legislators are also more sensitive about the consequences 
social policies have for individuals (Carroll 1988; Gidengil 1995), women believing the 
government, among other thing, had a responsibility to “provide…health care” (Shapiro 
and Mahajan 1986, Gilens 1988, Chaney, Alvarez and Nagler 1998).  This chapter 
reviews the history of child health insurance coverage in the United States, defines the 
model and hypotheses tested on the variable percentage of children without health 
insurance, and examines and discusses the results.   
HISTORY OF CHILD HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 
 Since the depression era, America has enacted numerous programs aimed at 
helping the families with dependent children, the poor and underprivileged.  As part of 
these programs, states were allowed to provide additional funding to welfare recipients 
for them to provide medical care for their children.  Much of the focus of these early 
programs, as part of the Social Security Acts, was to provide immunizations, 
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preventative measure to deal with infant mortality, and services to children with special 
needs (Mann 2003). 
With the enactment of Medicaid, Title XIX of the Social Security Act of 1965, 
health care coverage became an entitlement for low income families.  While many 
Americans are able to get access to health care through their employer based system, 
there are low income children who do not have this access and public coverage becomes 
crucial.  Medicaid was structured as a joint federal-state program to share the costs of 
providing health care to low income Americans.  The administration, guidelines for 
eligibility, and scope of coverage was left to the states.  However, states choose to 
participate in the program because they get federal funding to help cover some of the 
costs even though they must meet and comply with federal guidelines.  States also have 
the option to expand coverage beyond the minimum guidelines set by the federal 
government (Mann 2003). 
Amendments to the Medicaid programs in the 1980s eliminated cost sharing for 
families and health services were provided at no cost to the families.  However, this 
period saw a decline in the number of children enrolled in the Medicaid program.  When 
it was first enacted, the health coverage was only provided to families who received Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) payments from the government.  When 
the eligibility for AFDC declined in the 1970s and 1980s and subsequently, enrollment 
of children in the Medicaid program declined, Congress took action.  Eligibility was no 
longer based on AFDC status but on income level and it was opened to two-parent 
families.  In 1989, states were required to cover children under the age of six, and in the 
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early 1990s, the coverage expanded to required coverage until the age of eighteen.  
States could also expand coverage to those with higher incomes who were eligible for 
Medicaid and would receive federal funds to help cover these costs.  In the early 1990s, 
only one state, Washington, covered children at all ages based on Medicaid eligibility 
(Mann 2003). 
 In 1993, the Clinton Administration failed in their attempt to pass comprehensive 
health care legislation.  As a result, they were looking for smaller initiatives providing 
the needed coverage that could gain support in Congress, especially when dealing with 
children’s health insurance.  While health care coverage was primarily through 
Medicaid, there were a large number of uninsured children in each state who did not 
qualify because of income level.  Many families fell through the cracks because they 
were ineligible for coverage and they were unable to purchase a private health insurance 
plan because it was too expensive.  Prior to the 1997 legislation, it was up to the state to 
develop any additional programs to help cover uninsured individuals and children.   
In 1997, President Clinton signed into law the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (SCHIP) to insure children in families with too much income to qualify for 
Medicaid and too little to afford private insurance. States have the option of creating 
their SCHIP programs as an independent program separate from Medicaid, use SCHIP 
funds to expand their Medicaid program, or a combination of the two programs. States 
typically receive block grants of money to fund the program they choose and to 
encourage states to participate, the federal government pays a higher share of the 
spending on SCHIP than they do on Medicaid.  On average, the federal government pays 
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70 percent and state governments pay 30 percent of program costs. Unlike Medicaid, 
these enhanced federal matching payments are limited by national and state-specific 
annual limits (“Children’s Health Insurance Program” 2011).   
The states have flexibility in designing their eligibility requirements for SCHIP.  
States may cover children in families making 200 percent over the poverty level (set by 
the national government) or 50 percent above their Medicaid threshold.  When reviewing 
the requirements, there is a lot of variation among the states.  For example, in 2008, “23 
states allow a maximum income equal to 200 percent of the poverty level, 20 states set 
the limit above 200 percent of the poverty level, and 7 states set it below 200 percent of 
the poverty level” (Orzsag 2008, 2).  North Dakota reported the lowest with 140 percent 
of the poverty level and New Jersey was the highest at 350 percent of the poverty level 
(Orszag 2008). 
Given this historical information about children’s health insurance coverage, 
states were given a lot of flexibility with insuring children. Prior to the SCHIP program, 
the states were ultimately responsible for the health care coverage of children and with 
the passage of the federal program, states are still given flexibility in how many are 
covered.  Therefore, using children’s health insurance coverage as a variable is timely in 
order to determine whether female descriptive representation had any influence on the 
state action resulting in fewer uninsured children.  In other words, were states taking 
more action because of the presence of female legislators and female leadership? 
Figure 10 represents the mean percentage of uninsured children in the states from 
1987-2002.  The US Census Bureau did not start recording coverage rates among 
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children until 1987 so that is the start date for data collection for this study.  The 
percentage of uninsured children was steady at about 12 percent for much of the 1980s 
and then slightly increased in the 1990s.  In the mid-nineties, the rate of uninsured 
children dropped significantly to an all-time low of less than 10 percent.  The question 
for this chapter is whether the increase in female descriptive representation and 
incorporation has had any influence on the health insurance coverage rates of children in 
the states.  Women more interested and concerned about this issue, and an increase in the 
number of females in the legislature brings attention to issues ignored in the past.   
MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
The following model, as presented and explained in Chapter III, was used to 
estimate the coefficients for percentage of children without health insurance: 
Child Health Insuranceit+1 = b1(female legislatorsit)+b2(female 
legislatorsit*unified democratit)+ b3 (female health committee chairit)+b4 (female 
health committee chairit*unified democratit)+ +b5(female institutional 
incorporationit)+ b6 (female institutional incorporationit*unified 
democratit)+b7(female laborit)+ b8(democrat legislatureit) +b9(citizen 
liberalismit)+b10(political competitionit)+b11(incomeit)+ b12(povertyit). 
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The hypotheses for this study described were explained in Chapter III.  
According to hypothesis 1 (H1), female descriptive representation is positively 
associated with female group influence in representative bodies.  Since health care is 
always a top priority for females, an increase in the number of females in legislative 
bodies will result in a decrease in the percentage of uninsured children in the states.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2) states when female representatives are members of the governing 
coalition, female descriptive representation is positively associated with female group 
influence in representative bodies.  When unified Democratic government is interacted 
with female legislator, the coefficient will be positive, revealing the influence of female 
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for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 
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legislators on the rate of children without health insurance and it is conditional upon the 
presence of a unified democratic control of the state government. Predicted values will 
be calculated to determine the influence of female legislators in a liberal governing 
coalition.  According to hypothesis 3 (H3), when female representatives hold positions 
of power over specific policy areas, female descriptive representation is positively 
associated with female group influence in representative bodies.  In the case of child 
health insurance coverage, if a female is chair of the health committee in the state, the 
result will be a decrease in the percentage of children without health insurance in the 
state.  In H1, H2, and H3, the coefficients are expected to be negative because the 
dependent variable is decreasing. 
 Table 5 shows the increases in the number of females who serve as health 
committee chairs.  The number of female health committee chairs has increased 
significantly since the early 1990s.  From 1990 to 2002, the rate of female health 
committee chairs increased by about 58 percent.  With this increase in number, this 
research predicts female influence on the committee that is responsible for health care 
programs in the state will have an effect on overall children’s health insurance coverage. 
According to hypothesis 4 (H4), female control of formal leadership positions is 
positively associated with policies favoring women’s interests.  With more female 
institutional power in the legislature, the coefficient for female institutional 
incorporation will be negative revealing the influence on a decrease of uninsured 
children in the state.  Finally, hypothesis 5 (H5) states when parties share the policy 
goals of female representatives hold power, there is no relationship between levels of 
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female representation or institutional power and policies benefiting females. When the 
variables of female legislators, female committee chair, and female institutional 
incorporation are interacted with unified democrat government, the model predicts an 
increase in representation or incorporation provides no additional effects in a liberal 
governing coalition.   The coefficient for these interactions is expected to be positive in 
the case of this dependent variable because the political party shares these same policy 
preferences thus negating the influence of female legislators. Predicted values are 
calculated in order to understand the results and significance of the interaction terms, 
and to explain the influence of female legislators, committee chairs, and female 
leadership on child health insurance coverage. 
TABLE 5 FEMALE HEALTH COMMITTEE CHAIRS, 1987-2002 
Year Number of States Year Number of States 
1987 16 1995 26 
1988 16 1996 26 
1989 19 1997 32 
1990 19 1998 31 
1991 21 1999 33 
1992 22 2000 32 
1993 27 2001 29 
1994 27 2002 30 
Note: Cells represent the total number of states with a female health committee chair 
in either the House or Senate by year.  N=800 (50 states, 16 years). Source: State 
Legislative Leadership, Committees, and Staff. 
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TABLE 6  PRELIMINARY MODELS OF THE ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF  
 FEMALE REPRESENTATION AND INCORPORATION ON CHILD  
 HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE, 1987-2002 
 
Independent Variable Presence Specific Broad All Party 
Female Legislators (%) .07*     .07* .05* 
  (.02)     (.02) (.03) 
Fem Leg*UniDemGov         .08 
          (.05) 
Female Health Chair   .80*   .61* .93* 
    (.32)   (.30) (.34) 
Fem 
HlthChair*UniDemGov         -1.89 
          (.83) 
Female Inst Incorporation 
  
.02 -.01 -.02 
      (.01) (.02) (.02) 
Fem Inst Inc*UniDemGov         .04 
          (.05) 
Unified Dem Gov -.20 -.19 -.25 -.17 -1.34 
  (.46) (.45) (.45) (.46) (.99) 
Democratic Legislators (%) -.01 -.12 -.01 -.01 -.01 
  (.02) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Citizen Liberalism -.11* .10* -.10* -.11* -.11* 
  (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) 
Political Competition -.07* -.07* -.07* -.07* -.07* 
  (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Income .00* .00* .00* .00 .00* 
  (.00) (.00) (.00) .00 (.00) 
Poverty .63 .63* .63* .63* .63* 
 
(.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) 
Fem Labor Force Part -.10 -.08* -.07 -.10* .12* 
  (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) 
Child Health Uninsured (%) .04 .06* .05 .05* .05* 
  (.03) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Constant 15.15* 14.65* 13.93* 15.67* 16.77* 
 
(3.05) (3.12) (3.13) (3.08) (2.99) 
Wald χ2 1215.74* 1292.16* 1245.67* 1410.09* 1951.62* 
R
2
 .48 .48 .47 .48 .49 
Note: *p<.05 in a one tailed t-test.  Dependent Variable:  Percentage of Uninsured Children (t+1).  Cells 
contain OLS coefficients with Panel-Correlated Standard Errors in parentheses.  N=742 for all models 
(47 states, 16 years).  AK, HI, and NE are excluded.  
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RESULTS 
The results presented in Table 6 are the preliminary models run on the data and 
with only variables related to that model and the results are presented in the Table.   
As explained in Chapter III, these results are provided to address the issue of collinearity 
and the importance of the interaction terms in the models in order to explain the 
conditional effects of each variable.  The interaction between female legislators and 
unified democratic government (from the model, female legislatorsit*unified democratit) 
represents the Simple Incorporation Model.  The results from the model labeled “party” 
is the full model to show how the influence of female legislators is reduced in 
Democratic controlled governments. 
Table 7 presents the results of the full model. The Presence Model (H1) and the 
Specific Institutional Incorporation Model (H3) both reveal significant coefficients but 
in both cases, they are in the wrong direction.  Since with the variable percentage of 
children without health insurance the expectation is a decreased in the percentage of 
uninsured, the coefficient for female legislators and female health committee chair 
should be negative.  The Broad Institutional Incorporation Model (H4) was also not 
supported, with no significant results from the model.  The coefficient for female 
institutional incorporation was not significant thus there was no support for an increase 
in females in leadership positions regarding the percentage of uninsured in the state. 
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TABLE 7 THE EFFECT OF FEMALE REPRESENTATION AND  
  INCORPORATION ON CHILD HEALTH INSURANCE  
 COVERAGE, 1987-2002 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient 
Female Legislators (%) .05* 
  (.03) 
Female Legislators*Unified Dem Government .08 
  (.05) 
Female Health Committee Chair .93* 
  (.34) 
Female Education Committee Chair*Unified Dem Government -1.89 
  (.83) 
Female Institutional Incorporation -.02 
  (.02) 
Female Institutional Incorporation*Unified Dem Government .04 
  (.05) 
Unified Democratic Government -1.34 
  (.99) 
Democratic Legislators (%) -.01 
  (.02) 
Citizen Liberalism -.11* 
  (.02) 
Political Competition -.07* 
  (.02) 
Income .00* 
  (.00) 
Poverty .63* 
 
(.06) 
Female Labor Force Participation .12* 
  (.04) 
Child Health Uninsured (%) .05* 
  (.02) 
Constant 16.77* 
 
(2.99) 
Wald χ2 1951.62* 
R
2
 .49 
Note: *p<.05 in a one tailed t-test.  Dependent Variable:  Percentage of Uninsured Children (t+1).  Cells 
contain OLS coefficients with Panel-Correlated Standard Errors in parentheses.  N=742 for all models 
(47 states, 16 years).  AK, HI, and NE are excluded.   
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TABLE 8  PREDICTED VALUES OF FEMALE LEGISLATORS, FEMALE 
 HEALTH COMMITTEE CHAIR, FEMALE INSTITUTIONAL  
 INCORPORATION ON CHILD HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE  
 BY PARTY CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT, 1987-2002 
 
Variable 
Predicted 
Value 
Standard 
Error 
T-
Statistic 
Female Legislators (%)       
 
Divided or Unified Republican Government .05 .03 1.77 
  Unified Democratic Government -1.20 .87 -1.39 
Female Health Committee Chair 
   
 
Divided or Unified Republican Government .93* .35 2.65 
 
Unified Democratic Government -2.29 1.26 -1.83 
Female Institutional Incorporation       
 
Divided or Unified Republican Government -.02 .02 -.76 
 
Unified Democratic Government -1.31 .89 -1.47 
Note: Cells Represent percentages.  Predicted Value for female legislators, female committee chair, 
and female institutional incorporation were calculated using the following formula: 
Y=β0+β1X+β2Z+β3XZ. This illustrates the effect of a one-unit change in X on Y when condition Z is 
present and Z=0 when divided or unified Republican government is present and Z=0 when unified 
Democratic government is present (see Brambor et al. 2006).  
 
In order to understand the significance of the interaction terms and if female 
representation and incorporation is conditional upon the presence of a liberal governing 
coalition, predicted values are calculated.  Table 8 presents these values for female 
legislators, female health committee chair, and female institutional incorporation on the 
percentage of uninsured children by party control of government.  
The Simple Institutional Incorporation Model (H2) is not supported by the 
results. The predicted value for female legislators should be negative since the dependent 
variable, child health insurance coverage is measured by percentage of uninsured, but it 
is not significant.  Female representation does not have any additional effect on reducing 
the number of uninsured children in a state with a liberal governing coalition (unified 
Democratic government).  Figure 11 provides a graphical illustration of the effect of 
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female legislators on percentage of uninsured children by party control of government 
and it reveals that the percentage actually increases but the results are also not 
significant. 
 
The Party as a Substantive Representative Model (H5) is also not supported by 
these.  The effect for female legislators, female health committee chair, and female 
institutional incorporation should be positive and significant and this is not the case in 
any of the three.  Figures 11, 12, and 13 provide graphical illustrations of these effects in 
a divided or unified Republican government and a unified Democratic government.  The 
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Note: Values represent percentages as a result of percentage increases in females in the state 
legislature by party control of government. 
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only significant results of found with  female health committee chair in a divided 
government or a government controlled by the Republican Party which results in a .93 
percent increase in the number of uninsured children in a state as a result of a change 
from a male health committee chair to a female chair.  While the model only predicts the 
effects of a liberal governing coalition, these results are interesting and may provide 
implications for future research.    
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FIGURE 12 THE EFFECTS OF FEMALE HEALTH 
 COMMITTEE CHAIR ON CHILD HEALTH 
 INSURANCE COVERAGE BY PARTY CONTROL 
 OF GOVERNMENT  
Divided or Unified 
Republican  
Unified Democrat 
Note:  Values represent percentages as a result of moving from a male health committee 
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There are also a number of control variables with significant coefficients:  citizen 
liberalism, political competition, income, poverty, and female labor force participation.  
However, only in the cases of citizen liberalism and political competition index was the 
coefficient negative meaning an increase would result in a decrease of uninsured 
children.  When more individuals in the state are liberal and when there is more political 
competition in the state legislature between the parties, the result is a decrease in the 
number of uninsured children.  As mentioned previously, future research could examine 
the Democratic Party in states with high levels of citizen liberalism and competition to 
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Note: Values represent percentages as a result of increases in female institutional 
incorporation in the state legislature by party control of government. 
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determine if they actively seek to nominate women, especially liberal women, to attract 
votes in a highly competitive electoral environment.    
DISCUSSION 
 The results do not provide any support for the five models tested using the 
variable percentage of children without health insurance.  Results revealed that an 
increase in female representation and incorporation exerts no additional influence on 
reducing the number of uninsured children in a state with a liberal governing coalition.  
The results of a female health committee chair in a divided or unified Republican 
government on health insurance coverage did provide significant results.  Future 
research may want to address a non-liberal governing coalition and what may be 
happening with female legislators and their influence on policy in this type of political 
environment.    
While these results are disappointing when trying to argue the importance of 
female state legislators and leadership on the health coverage of children, there are a 
number of reasons that this particular variable may have these results.  Looking at the 
decrease in the number of children without health insurance, one could argue that it was 
the result of the SCHIP program passed in 1997 rather than the influence of females in 
the legislature.  States were not only provided an initiative from the national level to 
provide for children’s health care needs but the states were provided the funding for 
these services.  Much of the restraint on the states with providing social services is 
funding and since the national government made this a priority and provided grant 
money, the states had the resources.  An interesting way to study this issue may be to 
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look at what was happening in Congress during this time period.  While the number of 
females in Congress is a smaller percentage than in the state legislature, a study could be 
done of female descriptive representation in Congress as well as the female committee 
chairs and leadership roles to determine the influence on this legislation and the 
subsequent decrease in the number of uninsured children.   
 Also, coverage of children through a government program is an output of 
government.  Therefore, examining the number of female legislators, female committee 
chairs, and female leadership may not be the best approach to studying this variable.  
One important area that this particular study ignores is females and the legislation they 
sponsor.  While the number and leadership of females was not driving the change in 
health insurance coverage, results of studying legislation sponsorship may reveal that 
female legislators did push this issue.  Since the results reveal that in a liberal governing 
coalition, females exerted no additional influence, the Democratic Party was taking up 
this issue as important.  Covering children with health insurance was important and was 
being done in the states but it was not the presence or institutional incorporation of 
females who exerted the most influence. 
The last chapter provides a discussion of the overall findings and implications,  
and future research in this area. 
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CHAPTER VI 
WELFARE BENEFITS IN THE STATES 
1983-2002 
 
As mentioned in previous chapters, females more strongly support government 
spending programs because of their more compassionate stance on issues and their 
support of a more activist government.   The welfare of family and children is always a 
priority of females and since females are found to identify with other females on issues, 
or a group perspective on issues (Mansbridge 1995), funding for welfare benefits can be 
influenced by females in the legislature.  When the number of female state legislators 
increases, there are more females to focus their attention on issues ignored in the past.  
Since females prioritize this issue, we expect to find some changes in maximum monthly 
welfare benefits.  This chapter reviews the history of welfare benefits in the United 
States, defines the model and hypotheses tested on the variable welfare benefits, and 
examines and discusses the results.   
HISTORY OF WELFARE BENEFITS 
 The Great Society programs of the 1960s expanded welfare in the United States.  
At this time, individuals who were not elderly or disabled were able to receive 
government assistance through the welfare program.  Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) provided states with federal matching funds to provide cash assistance 
to needy families and children.  The federal government provided the money and the 
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states distributed it.  A family was eligible for AFDC if they fell below the need standard 
based on their income and the level a state determined a family needed to live. 
 In 1996, the Clinton Administration and Congress passed legislation changing 
the focus of the AFDC program.  The welfare program was reformed to a program 
providing short term assistance to families in need and began encouraging people back 
into the work force.  The national government was giving money to the state based on 
the number of people who were on welfare and gave the state no directive in how to 
distribute funds.  The change from the welfare reform act  resulted in the power being 
given back to the states.  As a condition of getting this money under this new program, 
Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF), states did have to meet requirements set by 
the federal government.  For example, the states had to set up programs to encourage 
people into the workforce and set a five year limit on the time one can receive TANF 
benefits.  Because TANF gave individual states increased flexibility with these new 
policies, the reforms implemented varied by state.  Schram found a relationship between 
the racial makeup in the state and tougher welfare policies. For example, if there were 
more blacks in the welfare system in a state, the result would be tougher welfare policies 
(2005).  The states were given a lot of control, and how they distributed the funds is 
interesting because of the potential influence of the players in the governing bodies.   
Figure 14 represents the maximum monthly welfare benefits from 1983-2002.  
As one can see, the benefit levels decreased over the years.  Given the varying degrees 
of funding and flexibility in the states, the variable is still appropriate to study because 
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there could be an effect on benefit levels as a result of female descriptive representation 
and incorporation. 
 
MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
The following model, as presented and explained in Chapter III, was used to 
estimate the coefficients for maximum monthly welfare benefits for a family of three: 
Welfare Benefitsit+1 = b1(female legislatorsit)+b2(female legislatorsit*unified 
democratit)+ b3 (female social services [welfare] committee chairit)+b4 (female 
social services [welfare] committee chairit*unified democratit)+ +b5(female 
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FIGURE 14 WELFARE BENEFITS IN THE STATES, 1983-2002 
Note: Values represent maximum monthly welfare beenfits for a family of three. N=960 
(48 states, 20 years.  AK and HI excluded becaue no data reported)  Source: U.S. Bureau 
of the Census. 
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institutional incorporationit)+ b6 (female institutional incorporationit*unified 
democratit)+b7(female laborit)+ b8(democrat legislatureit)+b9(citizen 
liberalismit)+b10(political competitionit)+ b11(incomeit)+b12(povertyit) 
The hypotheses for this study were described in Chapter III.  According to 
hypothesis 1 (H1), female descriptive representation is positively associated with female 
group influence in representative bodies.  The health and welfare of children and 
families is a priority among female legislators, thus, an increase in female descriptive 
representation results in an increase in maximum monthly welfare benefits for a family 
of three in the states.  Hypothesis 2 (H2) states when female representatives are 
members of the governing coalition, female descriptive representation is positively 
associated with female group influence in representative bodies.  When unified 
Democratic government is interacted with female legislator, the coefficient will be 
positive.  The influence of female legislators on welfare benefits is conditioned upon the 
presence of a liberal governing coalition.  In the case of this model and hypothesis, 
predicted values are calculated to determine the influence of female legislators on 
welfare benefits in a liberal governing coalition.  According to hypothesis 3 (H3), when 
female representatives hold positions of power over specific policy areas, female 
descriptive representation is positively associated with female group influence in 
representative bodies. If a female is chair of the social services committee in the state, 
the result will be an increase in maximum monthly welfare benefits for a family of three.   
Table 9 shows the increases in the number of females who served as social 
services committee chairs from 1983-2002.  The number of female social services 
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committee chairs has increased significantly since the late 1980s.  From 1986 to 2001, 
there was a 78 percent increase in the number of female social services committee 
chairs.  This research predicts the female influence on the committee responsible for 
welfare programs in the state will have an effect on the maximum monthly welfare 
benefits.  
TABLE 9    FEMALE SOCIAL SERVICES (WELFARE)  
COMMITTEE CHAIR, 1983-2002 
 
Year 
Number of 
States Year 
Number of 
States 
1983 22 1993 32 
1984 22 1994 32 
1985 18 1995 31 
1986 18 1996 29 
1987 22 1997 30 
1988 22 1998 31 
1989 25 1999 32 
1990 25 2000 34 
1991 23 2001 32 
1992 23 2002 16* 
Note: Cells represent the total number of states with a female social 
services (welfare) committee chair in either the House or Senate by year.  
N=1000 (50 states, 20 years).  Among the various states, the committee 
name may differ with jurisdiction over welfare policy and spending.  For 
example, Social Services, Social and Human Services, Health and Human 
Services Committee, or Health and Social Services. Source: State 
Legislative Leadership, Committees, and Staff.  The handbook began to 
report committee chairs differently in 2002 resulting in the drop in 
numbers from 2001 to 2002.  The 2002 number may not reflect the total 
number of states with a female social services committee chair. 
 
Hypothesis 4 (H4) predicts female control of formal leadership positions is 
positively associated with policies favoring women’s interests.  With an increase in the 
number of leadership positions held by females, the coefficient for female institutional 
incorporation will be positive leading to an increase in welfare benefits.  Finally, 
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according to hypothesis 5 (H5), when parties share the policy goals of female 
representatives hold power, there is no relationship between levels of female 
representation or institutional power and policies benefitting females. When the 
variables of female committee chair and female institutional incorporation are interacted 
with unified democrat government, the party as a substantive model predicts an increase 
in representation or incorporation provides no additional effects in a liberal governing 
coalition.  Again, to understand the interaction terms and the conditional effects of a 
liberal governing coalition, predicted values are calculated.  These values are expected to 
be negative because the political party shares these same policy preferences thus 
negating the influence of female legislators.  
RESULTS 
              Table 10 presents the results of the preliminary models run on the data with the 
dependent variable welfare benefits.  These results are provided to address the issue of 
collinearity, as discussed in Chapter III, and the interaction terms and conditional effects 
of each variable.   Each theoretical model was run with only variables related to that 
model and the results are presented in the Table.  The Simple Incorporation Model is 
represented by the interaction between female legislators and unified democratic 
government (Fem Ed Chair*UniDemGov).  The model labeled “party” are the results of 
the full model to show the influence of female legislators is negated in Democratic 
controlled governments (liberal governing coalitions). 
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TABLE 10  PRELIMINARY MODELS OF THE ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF 
 FEMALE REPRESENTATION AND INCORPORATION ON  
 WELFARE BENEFIT LEVELS, 1983-2002 
 
Independent Variable Presence Specific Broad All Party 
Female Legislators (%) 5.38*     5.83* 5.14* 
  (.46)     (.53) (.46) 
Fem Leg *UniDemGov         2.44 
          (1.35) 
Fem Soc Serv Chair   32.10*   18.97* 8.44 
    (7.99)   (7.23) (7.25) 
Fem SS Chair*UniDemGov         40.30* 
          (12.03) 
Fem Inst Incorporation 
  
1.34* -1.06* -.23 
      (.42) (.44) (.50) 
Fem Inst Inc*UniDemGov         -3.84* 
          (1.16) 
Unified Dem Gov 17.12* 16.93* 16.34* 17.58* 13.61 
  (7.80) (8.38) (8.26) (7.89) (14.61) 
Democratic Legislators (%) -.42 -.69* -.55 .51 -.48 
  (.31) (.30) (.32) (.32) (.31) 
Citizen Liberalism 2.58* 2.98* 2.94* 2.58* 2.65* 
  (.3) (.29) (.29) (.30) (.32) 
Political Competition 5.87* 5.93* 6.30* 5.62* 5.63* 
  (.46) (.47) (.43) (.48) (.46) 
Income -.01* -.10* -.01* -.01* -.01* 
  (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
Poverty -7.07* -7.89* -7.37* -7.38* -7.33* 
 
(1.24) (1.22) (1.21) (1.29) (1.34) 
Fem Labor Force Part .72 3.10* 2.99* .65 .99 
  (.64) (.73) (.75) (.62) (.63) 
Maximum Welfare Benefits -.03 -.02 .02 -.03 -.03 
  (.02) (.12) (.01) (.02) (.02) 
Constant 367.86* 271.55* 250.85* 389.17* 367.35* 
 
(65.45) 69.30 (69.22) (66.92) (67.03) 
Wald χ2 4485.33* 4833.37 5063.63* 4021.43* 4953.92* 
R
2
 .60 .57 .57 .60 .61 
Note: *p<.05 in a one tailed t-test.  Dependent Variable:  Maximum Welfare Cash Benefits for a family 
of three (t+1).  Cells contain OLS coefficients with Panel-Correlated Standard Errors in parentheses.  
N=940 for all models (47 states, 20 years).  AK, HI, and NE are excluded.   
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Table 11 presents the results of the full model.  The Presence Model (H1) is 
supported by the results.  The coefficient for female legislators is significant and positive 
meaning the increase in female descriptive representation results in an increase in 
welfare benefits in a state.  The Specific Institutional Incorporation Model (H3) is not 
supported by the results so moving from a male to a female social services committee 
chairs does not provide any additional influence on the welfare benefits levels. The 
Broad Institutional Incorporation Model (H4) was not supported by these results as the 
coefficient for female institutional incorporation was not significant.   
In order to understand the conditional effect of a liberal governing coalition, 
predicted values were calculated and presented in Table 12 with interesting results.   
The Simple Incorporation Model (H2) predicts that female legislators only affect policy 
in a liberal governing coalition (unified Democratic government).  According to these 
results, the hypothesis is not supported.  However, when increasing the number of 
female legislators by one percentage point in states with a divided government or a 
Republican controlled government, it will result in an increase of $5.14 in monthly 
welfare benefits.   While the model did not predict an influence in a non-liberal 
governing coalition, these results have implication for future research.  Figure 15 shows 
the effects of female legislators on monthly welfare benefits by party control of 
government. 
 
 
 
112 
 
TABLE 11    THE EFFECT OF FEMALE REPRESENTATION AND  
 INCORPORATION ON WELFARE BENEFIT LEVELS,  
 1983-2002 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient 
Female Legislators (%) 5.14* 
  (.46) 
Female Legislators*Unified Dem Government 2.44 
  (1.35) 
Female Social Services Committee Chair 8.44 
  (7.25) 
Female Soci Serv Committee Chair*Unified Dem Government 40.30* 
  (12.03) 
Female Institutional Incorporation -.23 
  (.50) 
Female Institutional Incorporation*Unified Dem Government -3.84* 
  (1.16) 
Unified Democratic Government 13.61 
  (14.61) 
Democratic Legislators (%) -.48 
  (.31) 
Citizen Liberalism 2.65* 
  (.32) 
Political Competition 5.63* 
  (.46) 
Income -.01* 
  (.00) 
Poverty -7.33* 
 
(1.34) 
Female Labor Force Participation .99 
  (.63) 
Maximum Welfare Benefits (%) -.03 
  (.02) 
Constant 367.35* 
 
(67.03) 
Wald χ2 4953.92* 
R
2
 .61 
Note: *p<.05 in a one tailed t-test.  Dependent Variable:  Maximum Welfare Cash Benefits for a family 
of three (t+1).  Cells contain OLS coefficients with Panel-Correlated Standard Errors in parentheses.  
N=940 for all models (47 states, 20 years).  AK, HI, and NE are excluded.   
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TABLE 12  PREDICTED VALUES OF FEMALE LEGISLATORS, FEMALE 
SOCIAL SERVICES (WELFARE) COMMITTEE CHAIR, AND 
FEMALE INSTITUTIONAL INCORPORATION ON WELFARE 
BENEFIT LEVELS BY PARTY CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT 
Variable 
Predicted 
Value 
Standard 
Error 
T-
Statistic 
Female Legislators (%) 
   
 
Divided or Unified Republican Government 5.14* .87 5.89 
 
Unified Democratic Government 21.19 20.78 1.02 
Female Social Services Committee Chair       
 
Divided or Unified Republican Government 8.44 9.56 .88 
  Unified Democratic Government 62.34* 26.91 2.32 
Female Institutional Incorporation 
   
 
Divided or Unified Republican Government -.23 .61 -.38 
 
Unified Democratic Government 9.53 21.47 .44 
Note: Cells represent dollar amounts.  Predicted values for female legislator, female committee 
chair, and female institutional incorporation were calculated using the following formula: 
Y=β0+β1X+β2Z+β3XZ. This illustrates the effect of a one-unit change in X on Y when condition Z 
is present and Z=0 when divided or unified Republican government is present and Z=1 when 
unified Democratic government is present (see Brambor et al. 2006).  
 
The Party as a Substantive Representative Model (H5) is also not supported by 
these results.  While the effect for female social services committee chair in a unified 
Democratic government is significant, it is in the wrong direction.  Moving from a male 
committee chair to a female committee chairs in liberal governing coalitions results in an 
increase of monthly welfare benefits by $62.34.  The model predicts that the effect 
would be negative because the Democratic Party is taking up the issue of welfare 
benefits negating any additional influence from female committee chair.  Figures 15, 16, 
and 17 provide a graphical illustration of the effects on welfare benefits by party control 
of government. 
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There are also a number of control variables with significant coefficients:  citizen 
liberalism, political competition index, income, and poverty.  In the case of citizen 
liberalism and political competition index, the coefficients are significant and positive.  
The more liberal ideological orientations in a state and the more competitive the party 
system, the more money for welfare benefits.  In the case of income and poverty, both 
coefficients are negative.  
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state legisaltures by party control of government. 
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DISCUSSION 
 The results of the models on welfare benefits are interesting and provide some 
significant results with female descriptive representation.  An increase in female 
descriptive representation does exert additional influence on the maximum monthly 
welfare benefit levels in a state.  The results indicate that increasing female legislators 
affect benefits but it occurs in a divided or unified Republican governing system.  While 
the model does not make this prediction, it does have implications for future research.  
There were also interesting findings with the Party as a Substantive Representative 
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FIGURE 16 THE EFFECTS OF FEMALE SOCIAL SERVICES 
 (WELFARE) COMMITTEE CHAIR ON WELFARE 
 BENEFIT LEVELS BY PARTY CONTROL OF 
 GOVERNMENT  
Divided or Unified 
Republican  
Unified Democrat 
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Note: Values represent dollar amounts as a result of moving from  a male social 
services (welfare) committee chair (0) to a female social services (welfare) committee 
chair (1) by party control of government. 
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Model.  While none of the effects were significant with the models predictions, 
increasing females legislators in a divided government or a unified Republican 
government results in an increase of maximum monthly welfare benefits.  As mentioned 
in previous chapters, female descriptive representation and incorporation in a non-liberal 
governing coalition may be the area that needs to be addressed.   
 
 An interesting way to dig deeper into this issue of female legislators influence on 
welfare benefit levels would be to examine the race of the legislators.  While Preuhs did 
not find support for an increase in black legislators on welfare benefit levels, he did find 
that black legislators perceived their role to help those in need.  Examining black female 
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FIGURE 17 THE EFFECTS OF FEMALE INSTITUTIONAL 
 INCORPORATION ON WELFARE BENEFIT 
 LEVELS BY PARTY CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT 
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Note: Values represent dollar amounts as a result of increases in female institutional 
incorporation in the state legislature by party control of government. 
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legislators may provide for interesting results when examining benefit levels. As 
mentioned in previous chapters, bill sponsorship would be an interesting way to examine 
this issue also.   
Since this is a funding issue, if one examined the finance committee, it may 
provide interesting results.  While the social services chair would appear to be the 
person, and committee, responsible for welfare in the state, coding of this variable was 
challenging.  Many states had a number of different social services type committees and 
judgment calls had to be made when coding.  Since all states have finance chairs and/or 
appropriations chairs, the influence on spending on welfare may be coming from that 
position instead of the social services chair.  Further, since this is an output of 
government, it is challenging to study.  States are given flexibility in administering the 
program so examining this issue using another variable may provide for interesting 
results with the influence of female representation and incorporation. 
 A discussion of the overall findings and future research will be discussed in the 
last chapter. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTION IN THE STATES, 
1983-1991 
 
Females are found to identify with other females on issues or a group perspective 
on issues (Mansbridge 1995) and there is greater accountability between women 
legislators and females in the public (Carroll 1984, 2003). Child support would be a 
female group salient issue important to females because of their support of the welfare of 
families and children (Dodson and Carroll 1991; Carroll 1994; Thomas 1991; Thomas 
1994; Thomas and Welch 1991; Tamerius 1995; Flammang 1997; Carroll 2000; Carroll 
2001; Carroll 2003).  When there is an increase in female descriptive representation, 
there are more females in the legislature and in leadership positions to focus their 
attention on issues ignored in the past.  It is not the argument in this research males do 
not care about increasing the percentage of child support payments and ensuring those 
payments are being received but since females prioritize issues like this one as highly 
important, we expect to find some changes in collection as a result. This chapter reviews 
the history of child support collection and enforcement in the United States, defines the 
model and hypotheses tested on the variable percentage of child support collection, and 
examines and discusses the results.   
HISTORY OF CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 
Prior to 1975, child support collection and enforcement were inconsistent among 
the states and based on a case by case method of setting amounts for child support 
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orders.  Since there were no uniform standards, the result was inadequate levels of 
support, inconsistency in the treatment of clients, and inefficient processes for 
determining the child support amount (Pearson, Thoennes, and Tjaden 1989).  The level 
of support has received the most attention in research.  In 1985, a study was conducted 
by the U.S. Office of Child Support Enforcement and found that if basic guidelines had 
been set, similar to the model used in Delaware and Wisconsin, $15 billion more in child 
support amounts would have been due (Haskins et al. 1985).  Further, laws in individual 
states put the burden on parents to collect support for their children.  If the noncustodial 
parent moved out of state, this became a larger burden because of interstate cooperation.  
By the 1980s, all states had enacted a version of the Uniform of Reciprocal Enforcement 
of Support Act which allows for custodial parents to have easier access to non-custodial 
parents in other states and enforcement of child support orders. While it did not solve 
this problem, it was a step in the right direction (Zimmermann 1994).  
In 1975, Title IV-D of the Social Security Act led to significant changes in the 
collection and enforcement of child support payments.  A separate division was created 
as part of the U.S. Health and Human Services Department to oversee the operation of a 
child support enforcement program.  The federal government required the states to 
establish a parent locator service, guideline for state operations, collect payments for all 
recipients of TANF, and a plan for the review of cases. In 1984, the Child Support 
Enforcement Amendments were enacted requiring all states to develop formulas to 
determine child support levels, mandatory income withholding procedures, processes to 
help expedite establishing and enforcing support orders, and allowing states to report 
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delinquent parents to consumer credit agencies.  Also, the amendments required states to 
develop guidelines for child support and welfare cases.  In 1988, The Family Support 
Act was enacted and required the courts to use state guidelines when establishing 
support amounts for non-welfare cases, and review their guidelines every four years 
(Legislative History of Child Support Enforcement, www.hhs.gov).   
Wilkins and Kesier (2004) examined child support agencies in their work on 
passive and active representation.  Passive representation is sometimes referred to as 
descriptive representation or the bureaucrat “looking like” the population she serves.  
Active representation occurs when bureaucrats use their discretion to advocate for the 
people they serve to help eliminate discrimination.  They authors were interested in 
addressing the question of whether the link between passive and active representation 
only exist when the consequences affect women.  In order for passive representation to 
affect active representation, two conditions must exist: first, bureaucrats must have 
discretion over the issue and second, the issue must be salient to women (Meier 1993; 
Wilkins and Keiser 2004).  In the case of child support enforcement and collection, this 
is the case.  Caseworkers and supervisors in child support divisions have discretion in 
implementation of programs.  Because these supervisors and caseworkers can see the 
affect that child collection has on their clients, they may aggressively pursue collection.  
Also, supervisors review cases each month which can help the clients as well as creating 
an environment of expectations of the caseworkers.  The caseworker’s role is also 
important because they are the one who deals directly with the clients, makes sure 
paperwork is in order, and research the case and resolve problems.  The results from 
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their study indicate that when there are a larger number of female supervisors, child 
support collection increases but only when it is beneficial to women.  In this case, TANF 
recipients may not benefit from receiving child support payments because of the risk of 
losing other financial assistance, informal support from the non-custodial parent, and in 
domestic violence cases, it may allow the abuser to locate the family.  As they predicted, 
passive representation does affect active representation when the policies directly benefit 
women. 
Significant changes have occurred at the state and national level with child 
support enforcement but the primary responsibility for enforcement falls on the state.  
Based on the Wilkins and Keiser study, the state level bureaucrats also play an important 
role in collection and enforcement.  Therefore, the selection of the dependent variable, 
child support collection, is appropriate when determining the effect of female descriptive 
representation in state legislatures.  Will female lawmakers have an impact on the child 
support collection as hypothesized in this study or, with the case of this variable, will 
there be other factors that exhibit more influence? This variable differs from the others 
in this work because education and welfare are funding issues and bureaucrats would not 
have direct influence on the amount of money allocated to the program.   
 Figure 18 represents the mean percentage of child support payments collected 
from 1983-1991.  As you can see, the percentage of child support payment collected 
tripled from the early 1980s until the early 2000s.   Given the responsibility of child 
support enforcement and collection on the states, this study should provide some 
interesting results on the influence of female representation. 
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MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
The following model, as presented and explained in Chapter III, was used to 
estimate the coefficients for percentage of child support collection: 
Child Support Collectionit+1 = b1(female legislatorsit)+b2(female 
legislatorsit*unified democratit)+ b3 (female social services [child support] 
committee chairit)+b4 (female social services [child support] committee 
chairit*unified democratit)+ +b5(female institutional incorporationit)+ b6 (female 
institutional incorporationit*unified democratit)+b7(female laborit)+ b8(democrat 
legislatureit)+b9(citizen liberalismit)+b10(political competitionit)+ 
b11(incomeit)+b12(povertyit) 
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FIGURE 18 CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTION IN THE STATES, 
 1983-1991 
Note: Values represnt mean percentage of child support collected in the states by year.  
N=450 (50 states, 9 years).  Source: U.S.  Bureau of the Census. 
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Chapter III explained all the hypotheses for this study.  According to the first 
hypothesis (H1), female descriptive representation is positively associated with female 
group influence in representative bodies.  Due to women’s feeling of accountability to 
other women, and believing in supporting the health and welfare of children and 
families, an increase in the female descriptive representation results in an increase in the 
percentage of child support payments collected in the states.  Hypothesis 2 (H2) states 
when female representatives are members of the governing coalition, female descriptive 
representation is positively associated with female group influence in representative 
bodies.  When unified Democratic government is interacted with female legislator, the 
coefficient will be positive.  The influence of female legislators on child support 
collection is conditioned upon the presence of a liberal governing coalition.  In the case 
of this model and hypothesis, predicted values are calculated to determine the influence 
of female legislators in a liberal governing coalition.  According to hypothesis 3 (H3), 
when female representatives hold positions of power over specific policy areas, female 
descriptive representation is positively associated with female group influence in 
representative bodies.  If a female is chair of the social services committee in the state, 
the result will be an increase in child support payments collected.   
Table 13 shows the increases in the number of females who serve as social 
services committee chairs from 1983-1991.  During this time period, there was not a 
large increase in females serving as committee chairs with jurisdiction over child support 
enforcement issues.  However, from 1985 to about 1990, there was an increase of about 
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39 percent in females serving as social services committee chair with jurisdiction over 
child support enforcement.  
TABLE 13 FEMALE SOCIAL SERVICES (CHILD SUPPORT)  
 COMMITTEE CHAIRS, 1983-1991 
 
Year Number of States Year Number of States 
1983 22 1988 25 
1984 22 1989 25 
1985 18 1990 25 
1986 18 1991 23 
1987 25   
 Note: Cells represent the total number of states with a female social services 
(child support) committee chair in either the House or Senate by year.  N=450 
(50 states, 9 years).  Among the various states, the committee name may differ 
with jurisdiction over child support.  For example, Social Services, Social and 
Human Services, Health and Human Services Committee, or Health and Social 
Services. Source: State Legislative Leadership, Committees, and Staff.  
 
Hypothesis 4 (H4) predicts female control of formal leadership positions is 
positively associated with policies favoring women’s interests.  With an increase in the 
number of leadership positions held by females, the coefficient for female institutional 
incorporation will be positive leading to an increase in child support collection.   
Finally, according to hypothesis 5 (H5), when parties share the policy goals of female 
representatives hold power, there is no relationship between levels of female 
representation or institutional power and policies benefitting females. When the 
variables of female committee chair and female institutional incorporation are interacted 
with unified democrat government, the party as a substantive model predicts an increase 
in representation or incorporation provides no additional effects in a liberal governing 
coalition.   The coefficient for these interaction terms should be negative because the 
political party negates any influence of female legislators on child support collection. 
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Predicated values are calculated to interpret the results and significance of the interaction 
terms and the influence of female legislators, committee chairs, and female leadership in 
liberal governing coalitions on child health insurance coverage. 
RESULTS 
Table 14 presents the results of the preliminary models run on the data with the 
dependent variable welfare benefits.  These results are provided to address the issue of 
collinearity and the importance of the interaction terms to the models in order to explain 
the conditional effects of each variable.   Each theoretical model was run with only 
variables related to that model.  The Simple Incorporation Model is represented by the 
interaction between female legislators and unified democratic government (Fem Ed 
Chair*UniDemGov).  The results from the model labeled “party” is the full model to 
show influence of female legislators is negated in a liberal governing coalition. 
Table 15 presents the results of the full model.  The Presence Model (H1) is not 
supported by these results.  The coefficients for female legislators is significant but it is 
in the wrong direction.  Increasing the number of female legislators does not exert 
influence on child support collection in a state and according to these results, actually 
decreases the percentage collected.  The Specific Institutional Incorporation Model (H3) 
is supported by these results.  Moving from a male social services committee chair to a 
female chair results in an increase in the percentage of child support payments collected 
in a state.  The Broad Institutional Incorporation Model (H4) was not supported as the 
coefficient for female institutional incorporation was not significant so there is no 
additional influence from females in leadership roles. 
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TABLE 14  PRELIMINARY MODELS OF THE ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF 
 FEMALE REPRESENTATION AND INCORPORATION ON CHILD  
 SUPPORT COLLECTION, 1983-1991 
 
Independent Variable Presence Specific Broad All Party 
Female Legislators (%) -.37*     -.49* -.44* 
  (.05)     (.08) (.12) 
Fem Leg*UniDemGov         -.14 
          (.52) 
Fem Soc Serv Chair   1.24*   1.66* 2.58* 
    (.63)   (.84) (.91) 
Fem SS Chair*UniDemGov         -2.64* 
          (2.51) 
Fem Inst Incorporation 
  
-.00 .13* .15 
      (.04) (.06) (.10) 
Fem Inst Inc*UniDemGov         -.06 
          (.16) 
Unified Dem Gov -3.91* -4.10* -4.14* -3.71* .47 
  (1.06) (1.01) (1.03) (1.04) (2.54) 
Democratic Legislators (%) .06* .11* .11* .06* .05* 
  (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02 (.02) 
Citizen Liberalism .11* .09* .09* .11* .12* 
  (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.04) 
Political Competition .24* .24* .25* .23* .25* 
  (.06) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) 
Income .00* .00* .00* .00* .00* 
  (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
Poverty -.68* -.54* -.54* -.68* -.73* 
 
(.15) (.14) (.14) (.15) (.16) 
Fem Labor Force Part .19 .09 .10 .17 .13 
  (.11) (.11) (.11) (.12) (.11) 
Child Support Collect. (%) .13* .13* .13* .14* .15* 
  (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Constant -14.53* -15.57 -16.02 -13.26* -12.95 
 
(11.27) (11.07) (10.89) (11.86) (12.09) 
Wald χ2 392.57* 433.03* 388.85* 548.51* 819.45* 
R
2
 .37 .34 .34 .38 .38 
Note: *p<.05 in a one tailed t-test.  Dependent Variable:  Percentage of Child Support Collected (t+1).  
Cells contain OLS coefficients with Panel-Correlated Standard Errors in parentheses.  N=423 for all 
models (47 states, 9 years).  AK, HI and NE are excluded.   
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TABLE 15 THE EFFECTS OF FEMALE REPRESENTATION AND  
INCORPORATION ON CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTION,  
1983-1991 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient 
Female Legislators (%) -.44* 
  (.12) 
Female Legislators*Unified Dem Government -.14 
  (.52) 
Female Social Services Committee Chair 2.58* 
  (.91) 
Female Soc Serv Committee Chair*Unified Dem Government -2.64* 
  (2.51) 
Female Institutional Incorporation .15 
  (.10) 
Female Institutional Incorporation*Unified Dem Government -.06 
  (.16) 
Unified Democratic Government .47 
  (2.54) 
Democratic Legislators (%) .05* 
  (.02) 
Citizen Liberalism .12* 
  (.04) 
Political Competition .25* 
  (.05) 
Income .00* 
  (.00) 
Poverty -.73* 
 
(.16) 
Female Labor Force Participation .13 
  (.11) 
Maximum Welfare Benefits (%) .15* 
  (.03) 
Constant -12.95 
 
(12.09) 
Wald χ2 819.45* 
R
2
 .38 
Note: *p<.05 in a one tailed t-test.  Dependent Variable:  Percentage of Child Support Collected (t+1).  
Cells contain OLS coefficients with Panel-Correlated Standard Errors in parentheses.  N=423 for all 
models (47 states, 9 years).  AK, HI and NE are excluded.   
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TABLE 16  PREDICTED VALUES OF FEMALE LEGISLATORS, FEMALE  
 SOCIAL SERVICES (CHILD SUPPORT) COMMITTEE CHAIR,  
 AND FEMALE INSTITUTIONAL INCORPORATION ON CHILD  
 SUPPORT COLLECTION, 1983-1991 
 
Variable 
Predicted 
Value 
Standard 
Error 
T-
Statistic 
Female Legislators (%) 
   
 
Divided or Unified Republican Government -.44* .12 -3.80 
 
Unified Democratic Government -.11 2.67 -.04 
Female Social Services Committee Chair       
 
Divided or Unified Republican Government 2.58* 1.22 2.11 
  Unified Democratic Government .41 3.12 .12 
Female Institutional Incorporation 
   
 
Divided or Unified Republican Government .15 .10 1.59 
 
Unified Democratic Government .55 2.78 .20 
Note: Cells represent percentages.  Predicted values for female legislator, female committee chair, and 
female institutional incorporation were calculated using the following formula: Y=β0+β1X+β2Z+β3XZ. 
This illustrates the effect of a one-unit change in X on Y when condition Z is present and Z=0 when 
divided or unified Republican government is present and Z=0 when unified Democratic government is 
present (see Brambor et al. 2006).  
 
To understand the conditional nature of influence from institutional 
incorporation, Table 16 presents the predicted values for female legislators, female  
social services committee chair, and female institutional incorporation on the percentage 
of child support collected by party control of government. The Simple Institutional 
Incorporation Model (H2) is not supported by these results. The effect of female 
legislators and in a unified Democratic government is not significant.  Thus, the 
influence of female descriptive representation on child support payment collection is not 
conditioned by a liberal governing coalition.  The Party as a Substantive Representative 
Model is also not supported.  None of the effect of the independent variables in a liberal 
129 
 
governing coalition are significant.  Interestingly, the effects of female legislators and 
female social services committee chair in a divided government or a unified Republican 
government is significant.  For example, the Republican Party appears to be negating the 
influence of female legislators because the result is a decrease of .44 percentage points in 
child support collection.  None of the models make a prediction about a non-liberal 
governing coalition but with these results, future research needs to consider this effect.  
Figures 19, 20, and 21 provide a graphical illustration of the effects by party control of 
government. 
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FIGURE 19 THE EFFECTS OF FEMALE LEGISLATORS ON 
 CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTION BY PARTY 
 CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT 
Unified Democratic 
Divided or Unified Republican 
Note: Values represent percentages as a result of percentage increase in females in state 
legisaltures by party control of government. 
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The following control variables had significant coefficients:  Democratic 
legislators, citizen liberalism, political competition index, income and poverty.  In the 
case of Democratic legislators and citizen liberalism, the coefficient is positive thus 
resulting in an increase in child support collection in states with more Democratic 
lawmakers and in more liberal states.  In states with more party competition, child 
support payment collection increases.  Finally, an increase in income in a state results in 
more child support collected while an increase in poverty rates results in a decrease.  
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FIGURE 20 THE EFFECTS OF FEMALE SOCIAL SERVICES 
 (CHILD SUPPORT) COMMITTEE CHAIR ON 
 CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTION BY PARTY 
 CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT 
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Note: Values represent percentages as a result of moving from  a male social services 
(child support) committee chair (0) to a female social services (child support) committee 
chair (1) by party control of government. 
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DISCUSSION 
 For the dependent variable of child support collection in the state, the results are 
similar to the other variables.  Female descriptive representation did influence the 
percentage of child support collected by a state.  While increasing the number of females 
in the state legislatures did not result in any additional influence on the amount of child 
support collected, having a female serve as social services committee chair did lead to 
additional child support collected.  As was the case with all the other dependent 
variables, female institutional incorporation also did not exert additional influence on 
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FIGURE 21 THE EFFECTS OF FEMALE INSTITUTIONAL 
 INCORPORATION ON CHILD SUPPORT 
 COLLECTION BY PARTY CONTROL OF 
 GOVERNMENT 
Unified Democratic 
Divided or Unified Republican 
Note: Values represent percentages as a result of increases in female institutional 
incorporation in the state legislature by party control of government. 
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this variable.  The Party as a Substantive Representative Model was also not supported 
by the results with this variable.  In the presence of a liberal governing coalition, the 
results indicated that it does not negate the influence of female descriptive representation 
and incorporation.  In the case of female legislators, the Republican Party may be 
negating the influence according to these results but further research would need to 
consider a non-liberal governing coalition in its model to full determine the influence. 
 In this case, Wilkins and Keiser may have found a better way of examining 
passive, or descriptive, representation.  It could be in the case of child support, the 
bureaucrats have more influence over the policy output than the legislators.  Also, while 
the state government still has control over enforcement, the federal government did 
establish mandates over the years which could have exerted more influence in this area 
than the individuals who serve in the legislature.  This could have resulted in the 
bureaucratic agency charged with enforcing these new policies, thus, exerting more 
influence. 
 A discussion of the overall findings and future research will be discussed in the 
conclusions chapter. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study contributed to the literature on female descriptive representation by 
examining female descriptive representation and incorporation in legislative bodies and 
answering the research question, does an increase in female descriptive representation, 
institutional mechanisms of influence, or other political conditional factors lead to better 
substantive representation of female group salient issues?  Rather than simply studying 
the increase in females in legislatures, this study using state level data examined the 
complexity of the lawmaking body, the mechanisms determining influence, and the 
conditional effects of liberal governing coalitions, revealing the influence of female 
lawmakers.  Previous work does not account for all of these effects until Preuhs’ 2006 
work using race.  This study replicated that work using female descriptive representation 
in hopes of revealing the same conclusions about the effects of female descriptive 
representation and incorporation on public policy issues important to females.  In a 
larger context, this work was designed to show the importance of a continued increase in 
the number of female lawmakers and the longevity of their terms giving them 
opportunities to serve in leadership roles and increasing their policy influence.  While 
the increase in females in state legislatures has slowed significantly in the past decade, 
the number of women serving in committee chair positions and leadership positions, like 
speaker of the house, senate president, or majority and minority leaders has increased.  
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More women in office is a positive indicator of a trend toward gender equality, and the 
longer they are in these positions, the stronger their voice on female group salient issues. 
 Table 17 presents a summary of the overall findings for each model on each 
dependent variable.  As revealed, few of the models were supported with the dependent 
variables selected for this study. 
TABLE 17 SUMMARY OF MODELS AND RESULTS 
Models Education Health  Welfare 
Child 
Support 
Presence Model (H1) x x YES x 
Simple Incorporation Model (H2) x x x x 
Specific Institutional 
Incorporation Model (H3) x x x YES 
Broad Insitiutional Incorporation 
Model (H4) x x x x 
Party as a Substantive 
Representation Model (H5) x x x x 
Note: YES indicates the model was supported for the identified dependent variable. 
 
 The results of this study did not strongly support the Presence Model (H1).   This 
model predicts that female descriptive representation is positively associated with female 
group influence in representative bodies on the four dependent variables.  In the case of 
per pupil educational expenditures, percentage of children without health insurance, and 
percentage of child support collected, the coefficients were not significant and in all 
cases, were in the wrong direction.  The outcome is consistent with the findings of 
Preuhs that an increase in black representatives did not result in an increase in welfare 
benefits.  Interestingly, with the variable welfare benefits, this study found significant 
results.  An increase in female descriptive representation exerts influence on the 
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maximum monthly welfare benefits for a family of three in a state.  Females express 
concern about the welfare of families and children so welfare benefits is a female group 
salient issue.  Thus, female descriptive representation did influence substantive 
representation in this case. 
Results from the Specific Institutional Incorporation Model (H3) are similar to 
the Presence Model.  When female representatives hold positions of power over specific 
policy areas, female descriptive representation is positively associated with female group 
influence in representative bodies.  The presence of female committee chairs was 
examined to determine their influence in the four policy areas.  While results for per 
pupil educational expenditures and percentage of children without health insurance 
were significant, they are in the wrong direction so the results did not support the 
hypothesis.  The coefficient for welfare benefits was not significant.  With the issue of 
percentage of child support collected, the results were significant and in the right 
direction.  Having a female social services committee chair responsible for child support 
policy in a state exerts additional influence with increasing the percentage of child 
support collected.  The structure of the committee system, where the major work is done 
on legislation, is important in the state.  Legislators work hard for a place on these 
committees and to serve as chair because they understand the influence they can have 
over legislation in that policy area.  Therefore, we expect to see significant results with 
this model. However, as noted in Chapter III, there are challenges to coding this 
variable.  Without knowing the specific jurisdiction of each committee in each state, it 
may not be possible to know if the committee that works on this issue was correctly 
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specified making the testing of this model on all fifty states over a twenty year period.  
Further, since two of the dependent variables directly deal with funding, it is possible 
that the finance, appropriations, or budgetary committees in a state may have more 
influence over expenditures than the committees selected for this study. 
In the case of the Broad Institutional Incorporation Model (H4), none of the 
models produced significant results in each of the four policy areas selected.  According 
to the hypothesis, female control of formal leadership positions is positively associated 
with policies favoring women’s interests.  As females increased their numbers in 
leadership positions like speaker of the house, senate president, majority and minority 
party leaders, rules and finance committee chair, they did not exert more influence over 
the policy areas selected.  The challenge with this model is that while there are general 
similarities in the structure of state legislatures, there are also differences in these 
legislatures based on the rules and procedures established.  In some legislatures, the 
leadership may provide certain positions considerable authority and thus provide those 
individuals opportunities to exert influence over policy.  In other states, the power 
structure could be different.  There are enough similarities in order to test this model but 
the results indicate that different ways to study leadership may be better.  Case studies 
would provide a better opportunity to test this model in order to gain an understanding of 
the leadership positions and the powers they have influencing policy. Also, this would 
allow the opportunity to examine the people in these positions and their actions with 
regards to women’s interests and issues.  While the position of lieutenant governor was 
excluded from the list of leadership positions because it is an elected position, it could be 
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interesting to examine the role of that individual in the state legislature.  The individual 
in this position is accountable to her constituents so what action would a female in this 
office take to advance women’s issues?  It may also be interesting to examine the actions 
of speakers of the house, senate presidents or lieutenant governors, to determine if they 
appointed more females than males to committee chair positions or positions like 
majority or minority leader.    
In order to test the last two models of the study, interaction terms were created.  
Unified Democratic government was interacted with female legislators, female 
committee chair, and female institutional incorporation to test the Simple Incorporation 
Model (H2) and the Party as a Substantive Representative Model (H5).  To determine 
significance of the interaction terms, predicted values were calculated revealing the 
influence of X on Y with conditional affect Z.  According to the Simple Incorporation 
Model, when female representatives are members of the governing coalition, female 
descriptive representation is positively associated with female group influence in 
representative bodies.  When female legislators is interacted with unified Democratic 
government, the results should indicate female legislators only exert influence over the 
four policy areas if their presence occurs in a liberal governing coalition.  With all the 
policy issues, per pupil educational expenditures, percentage of children without health 
insurance, welfare benefits, and percentage of child support collected, the results were 
not significant.  While the models are not supported in this case, one could take the 
results to mean that female legislators can exert influence outside of liberal governing 
coalitions.  The models did not specifically predict the influence of females in a non-
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liberal governing coalition, divided government control or unified Republican 
government, and the results reveal something may be happening in that political 
environment.  For example, in the case of welfare benefits, the predicted value for 
divided or unified Republican government is positive and significant.  Would this mean 
that when female legislators are members of the Republican Party or in the presence of a 
divided government, they would exert more influence over welfare benefit levels, 
meaning that female influence is not confined to being part of a liberal governing 
coalition?  These models don’t control for this but it is interesting given the results and 
should be explored in future research.   Further, this begs the question of whether the 
member’s political party needs to be considered as mentioned in Chapter III.  Since the 
number of female Democratic legislators has consistently been about 20 percentage 
points during the twenty years of this study, there are no trend changes, just consistency 
in the gap.  But, with increases overall, there are increases in females in the Republican 
Party.  Given what we learned from the literature on the 104
th
 congress (1995-1996), a 
comparative study of state legislatures with larger proportion of female Democrats 
versus states with a larger proportion of female Republicans could provide interesting 
results.    Case studies may be a better way to understand the full nature of what is going 
on in the states with welfare.  Also, it would be interesting to study both Democratic and 
Republican female lawmakers to tease out the influence from those groups.  If female 
legislatures are representing the group perspective no matter which party is in power, 
studying the political environment in a smaller number of states could provide more 
insight with this policy issue.  As previously mentioned, knowing the female member’s 
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political party could lead to interesting questions about female legislators working 
together across party lines.  With a steady increase in both Democrat and Republican 
female legislators, do we see more collaboration on women’s interests and issues?  Is 
there a threshold that is reached that changes this collaboration?  What if the 
Republicans are the majority party?  Do female Republican legislators still cross party 
lines to work on issues important to females?  Work has been done in these areas so 
examining political party and political environment based on what was learned from this 
work provides good questions for future research. 
The Party as a Substantive Representative Model provided the most significant 
results in this study.  The hypothesis predicts that when parties that share the policy 
goals of female representatives hold power, there is no relationship between levels of 
female representation or institutional power and policies benefitting females.  The 
Democratic Party will address policy issues important to females so increasing the 
number of female in the legislature, having them serve as committee chairs over these 
policy areas, and increasing the number of females in leadership positions will not have 
any additional influence over policy.  The party negates the female influence.  With all 
the variables of this study, none of the results were significant.  However, finding no 
support for this model could also mean that females are exerting some policy influence.  
In other words, the Democratic Party is not negating the influence of female lawmakers. 
Further, the results for divided government or unified Republican government are 
interesting. For example, with the variables per pupil educational expenditures and 
percentage of child support collected, the predicted values for female legislators and 
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female committee chair in a divided government or unified Republican government were 
negative and significant.  Would this mean that the political environment (having 
divided control or when the Republican party is in charge) negates the influence female 
legislative influence over these two policy issues?  Is the Republican Party addressing 
these issues or when the political environment is divided, are parties working together on 
addressing these female group salient issues?  These questions cannot be answered by 
this study but it does provide questions for future research. 
In summary, with three of the four dependent variables, female descriptive 
representation and incorporation did have some influence on substantive representation 
of female group salient issues.  The female influence is important and increasing the 
number of females in the legislature will result in more policy and benefits for issues 
important to women in society.  However, there are other ways one could study this 
issue to possibly reveal even stronger influence from increasing female numbers.  There 
are challenges with testing these models as Preuhs did and with the issues selected for 
this study. 
 There are challenges with doing a pooled time series analysis with state 
legislatures.  There are many similarities in the state legislative structure, processes, 
committee system, and leadership that lend itself to this type of study.  At the same time, 
there are differences in state legislatures in these areas.  If a case study were done, 
differences could be examined and control variables included.  The problem with this 
study is examining the fifty states over a twenty year period provides challenges in 
collecting this type of data.  Each legislative session, rules and procedures may change 
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in each legislature.  The speaker of the house or senate president also has control over 
legislation and the committee it is assigned.  Without knowing the dynamics of that 
particular legislative session, these are all unknowns.  All one can do is speak in general 
terms.  A case study could provide information on politics of the state, characteristics of 
the legislators and legislative leadership beyond what was collected in this study, 
specific jurisdiction of each committee and policy they oversee, and rules and 
procedures of that session.  One could also look into the legislation that was sponsored 
by lawmakers which could provide an interesting analysis.  Finally, the challenges faced 
with coding of female committee chairs in this study could be addressed in a case study 
or a study of a small number of legislators.  In-depth research could be done of the 
committees in each state and the legislation over which they had jurisdiction.  One could 
also examine the specific legislation in each committee to see if they were dealing with 
these particular female group salient issues.  It could be that the finance, appropriations 
or budgeting committees in states exert more influence over legislation dealing with 
funding than committees with jurisdiction over that policy area.  Having this information 
as well as knowing which legislation females are sponsoring could provide an interesting 
analysis in these areas.  Also, through interviews, the priorities of female legislators 
could reveal which issues they support the most and tracking that legislation through the 
process and their involvement may provide interesting results. 
 Since the presence of a liberal governing coalition did not reveal significant 
results in this study, further analysis of political parties’ role in the policymaking process 
could be examined.  Many times legislators will find that while they have a personal 
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agenda, supporting their political party is the way to achieve their goals, whatever those 
goals may be.  As Swers found in her work, female members of Congress revealed that 
they will change their sponsorship on legislation to advance their position as a member 
of the majority party (Swers 2000).  This could be what was happening in this work.  
But, female lawmakers also reveal they work to promote women’s rights legislation and 
represent women’s issues.  What kind of influence do female legislators have on their 
party?  Are they influencing the agenda during the legislative session?  In other words, 
are they exerting influence but not through the mechanisms tested in this study?  Further, 
given the significant results of this study with divided or Republican control of 
government, are female Republican legislators shaping their party’s agenda in terms of 
issues important to females?  Given the results of this study, future research should 
control for these factors or develop a study that can address the female lawmakers of 
both political parties. 
 Preuhs' work studied the racialized political environment in the states.  His 
findings revealed that a racialized political context results in no effect or negates the 
effect of black descriptive representation (2006).  This work did not control for region to 
study that effect on female descriptive representation and incorporation.  However, given 
what is known from this study, regional difference in political party may provide an 
interesting study.  If divided control of government or a government in which the 
Republican Party is in control is influencing female representation, studying differences 
in political party and political environments across the states may provide an interesting 
analysis of female influence on policy issues.  How is the Republican Party in northern 
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states different than southern states?  Are there regional difference among female 
Democratic and Republican legislators and their ability to shape their party’s agenda?  
How are the parties responding to female group salient issues when the control of 
government is divided?  These questions would provide an interesting analysis given the 
results of this study. 
 As scholars have argued, “real” gains in policy responsiveness are dependent on 
achieving a critical mass, or moving from just a few “token” members to becoming the 
minority in the legislature (Childs and Krook 2008; Kanter 1977; Schwindt-Bayer and 
Mishler 2005). As the numbers increase, females affect the culture of the legislature and 
begin to form alliances and coalitions. In most states, females have not reached this 
critical mass.  An interesting study for future research would be to compare a state with a 
large number of females with a state that has not reached that “critical” level and 
determine what kind of influence women have over policy issues.  The number of 
females may be critical to an analysis of governing bodies and women have not reached 
those numbers in most states and in Congress.  As studies have revealed, women have 
been influential in local governing bodies when the governing board is smaller and the 
females have a larger presence (Flammang 1985).  A caution in studying it this way 
would be females being too numerous to be considered a “cohesive group” and thus 
being female or male becomes less important to the legislators (Reingold 1992).  
 As Pitkin suggested decades ago, the study of representation should include all 
four dimensions formal, descriptive, substantive, and symbolic (1967). Significant 
amounts of research has examined formal representation and the rules and procedures 
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related to the selection of representatives and the importance of studying that along with 
descriptive representation (see Matland and Taylor 1997, for example). Further, 
Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler did find connections between these four dimensions.   The 
“formal representative structure and processes exert powerful influences on the extent of 
women’s descriptive representation, policy responsiveness, and symbolic representation” 
(2005, 424).  Also, as Mansbridge suggests, studying promissory representation has an 
impact on legislative behavior because legislators are accountable to their constituents 
because of their election goals (Mansbridge 2003; Pitkin 1967).   
Additional challenges with the selection of the dependent variables for this study 
are that each variable is a policy output: spending on education and welfare and 
percentage of children without health insurance and child support collected.  Studies on 
legislatures reveal the influence of lawmakers in all policy areas because they are able to 
determine the budget and pass legislation that can affect all areas of government.  
However, Wilkins and Keiser may have a better approach to studying female descriptive 
representation in their study of bureaucrats.  Will active representation only exist when 
consequences affect women?  In their study, looking at female descriptive representation 
of bureaucrats may be a better approach because these individuals have discretion over 
the issue and implementation over the policy but also they deal directly with the 
recipients of the government service and understand the importance and how it directly 
benefits them.  Also, an interesting study could examine the role of female legislators 
and their oversight of welfare bureaucracies.  Are female lawmakers more engaged in 
the oversight process than their male colleagues? Are females more active in making 
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sure that the bureaucrats are doing their job and providing the services to recipients, 
especially in areas benefitting women?  These questions could provide for an interesting 
analysis of female descriptive representation and the influence on substantive 
representation of female group salient issues. 
Does an increase in female descriptive representation, institutional mechanisms 
of influence, or other political conditional factors lead to better substantive 
representation of female group salient issues?  In the end, it is the hope for future 
research that females are able to represent the “group” perspective and support policy 
issues important to females in society.  Examining the issue in a different way or with 
different dependent variables may provide better results indicating the importance of 
female descriptive representation on substantive representation of female group salient 
issues.  With this study’s results, one can’t argue that the presence of more women in 
public office will mean they will be more represented because increasing their numbers 
is not significant…but it is necessary (Sapiro 1981). 
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APPENDIX  
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
Variable Range Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Description/Coding and Source 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
   Per Pupil Educational 
Expenditures 
2761-
14018 
6203 1999.29 Amount in constant dollars spent 
per student per year on education. 
State Politics and Policy 
Quarterly State Data Set. 
Child Health Insurance 
Coverage 
2.00-
27.40 
12.11 4.99 Percentage of children without 
health insurance. US Bureau of 
the Census.   
Welfare Benefits 150.77-
1036.33 
489.7 159.15 Maximum AFDC/TANF cash 
benefit levels for a family of 
three, in dollars adjusted using 
Berry, Fording, and Hanson 
consumer price index. US Bureau 
of the Census (Preuhs data 1984-
1993). 
Child Support Collection 1.14-
74.47 
15.34 11.79 Percentage of voluntary child 
support payments collected by 
year. US Bureau of the Census 
(Kaiser data). 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES   
 Female Legislators 1.70-
40.8 
18.61 7.95 Percentage of the total legislative 
seats held by females. Center for 
American Women and Politics 
(CAWP). 
Female Education 
Committee Chair 
0-1 0.40 0.49 Indicates whether a woman (1) or 
a man (0) is committee chair with 
jurisdiction over education 
policy.  State Legislative 
Leadership, Committees, and 
Staff. 
Female Health Committee 
Chair 
0-1 0.49 0.50 Indicates whether a woman (1) or 
a man (0) is committee chair with 
jurisdiction over health policy.  
State Legislative Leadership, 
Committees, and Staff. 
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Female Social Services 
(Welfare) Committee Chair 
0-1 0.53 0.50 Indicates whether a woman (1) or 
a man (0) is committee chair with 
jurisdiction over welfare policy.  
State Legislative Leadership, 
Committees, and Staff. 
Female Social Services 
(Child Support) Committee 
Chair 
0-1 0.55 0.50 Indicates whether a woman (1) or 
a man (0) is committee chair with 
jurisdiction over child support 
policy.  State Legislative 
Leadership, Committees, and 
Staff. 
Female Institutional 
Incorporation 
0-1 16.7 10.15 Chamber institutional 
incorporation is coded with the 
following formula: Institutional 
Incorporationfist = 100 x ΣWfist Pist 
/ΣWfit  
 
   
(Upper Chamber Institutional 
Incorporation+Lower Chamber 
Institutional Incorporation)/2. 
 
   Chamber power is determines for 
female group f, in each chamber 
I, in each state s, in year t.  P is 1 
if the position is held by a female 
and 0 otherwise.  W is the weight 
given to each position.  The 
chamber power score is scaled so 
that the range is from 0, 
indicating no females hold these 
positions, to 100, indicating that 
females hold all institutional 
positions. 
 
   Lower house weights: 10 for 
Speaker; 8 for Speaker pro tem or 
Assist. Speaker (coded only if 
this position is held by one 
individual); 8 for Majority Party 
Leader of Fiscal Policy Chairs; 7 
for Rules Committee; 6 for other 
committee chairs; 5 for Minority 
Party Leader. 
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   Upper house weights: 10 for 
Presiding Officer (not coded if 
President is Lt. Gov.; 10 for 
President pro tem (8 if President 
is presiding officer); 8 for 
Majority Party Leader of Fiscal 
Policy Chairs; 7 for Rules 
Committee; 6 for other committee 
chairs; 5 for Minority Party 
Leader. 
 
   State Legislative Leadership, 
Committees, and Staff. 
Unified Democratic 
Government 
0-1 0.272 0.45 Indicates a liberal governing 
coalition and coded 1 if 
Democratic Party controls the 
state legislature and governor's 
office, 0 otherwise. Klarner 2003 
(see references).   
Democratic Legislators 11.43-
95.40 
56.46 16.66 Percentage of the total legislative 
seats held by the Democratic 
Party. Klarner 2003 (see 
references). 
Citizen Liberalism 8.45-
95.97 
48.41 14.82 Indicates the state-year citizen 
liberalism index ranging from 0, 
indicating the most conservative, 
to 100. the most liberal. 
Political Competition 9.26-
56.58 
39.03 11.29 Political competition equals 1- 
|50-percent legislative seats held 
by Democrats|.  Range is 0 for 
least competitive to 50 for most 
competitive. State Politics and 
Policy Quarterly State Data Set. 
Income 8126.60
-42706 
2014
7 
6491.75 Indicates per capita income in 
constant thousands of dollars.  
State Politics and Policy 
Quarterly State Data Set. 
Poverty 2.90-
27.00 
12.98 4.02 Indicates the percent of the 
population living below the 
poverty threshold.  US Bureau of 
the Census. 
Female Labor Force 
Participation 
38.40-
73.10 
59.06 5.04 Indicates the percent of females 
in the workforce. State Politics 
and Policy Quarterly. 
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